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CLASHING CANONS AND THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
T. Leigh Anenson, J.D., LL.M., Ph.D.* and
Jennifer K. Gershberg, J.D.**
ABSTRACT
This Article is the first in-depth examination of substantive canons that judges
use to interpret public pension legislation under the Contract Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and state constitutions. The resolution of constitutional controversies
concerning pension reform will have a profound influence on government
employment. The assessment begins with a general discussion of these interpretive
techniques before turning to their operation in public pension litigation. It
concentrates on three clashing canons: the remedial (purpose) canon, the “no
contract” canon (otherwise known as the unmistakability doctrine), and the
constitutional avoidance canon. For these three canons routinely employed in
pension law, there has been remarkably little research on their history, evolution, or
impact. This study spotlights the methodology that underlies these diverse and
complicated judgments. Illuminating actual judicial practices lets us better
comprehend when, how, and why these canons function. It puts us in a position
to choose the most appropriate canon(s) and to offer improvements on their
operation. It also allows us to relate the role of canons to other kinds of legal
reasoning. Significantly, studying these canons fills a void in state statutory
interpretation as well as contributes to a better understanding of state court
enforcement of the Contract Clause that has received scarcely any attention.
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[T]he inescapable problems of [Contract Clause] construction have
been: What is a contract? What are the obligations of contracts? . .
. Questions of this character, “of no small nicety and intricacy,
have vexed the legislative halls, as well as the judicial tribunals,
with an uncounted variety and frequency of litigation and speculation.”
—Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell

1

INTRODUCTION
Canons of construction can have a profound effect in shaping
2
the law. In a number of important decisions challenging the constitutionality of public pension reform, judges have applied various
3
canons to interpret state and local legislation. Across and within
states, however, these methods of interpretation have not been

1. 290 U.S. 398, 429 (1934) (quoting 3 JOSEPH L. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1369 (1833)).
2. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
452 (1989) (“The canons of construction continue to be a prominent feature in the federal
and state courts.”); see generally William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation,
130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1107–12 (2017) (discussing canons of interpretation).
3. See discussion infra Part II.
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4

congruent. In fact, they have directed courts to reach completely
5
opposite conclusions.
6
Public pension plans across the United States are in crisis. Their
impending insolvency jeopardizes the fiscal security of states and
cities, the nation’s long-term financial health, and the retirement
7
benefits of government workers. The pension debt debacle has
spurred politicians in nearly every state to implement reforms that
8
affect millions of workers and retirees. Courts have entered the
milieu as impacted employees test whether these changes surmount legal obstacles and comply with constitutional require9
ments.
The primary barrier to pension reform is the Contract Clause
10
found in both the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions. A
condition of any successful constitutional challenge under this
11
clause is an initial finding of a contract. Almost all of the new
12
pension cases turn on this issue. The key question influenced by
the choice of canons is whether current and former employees
have an unchangeable contract to their previous, legislatively-

4. See discussion infra Part II.
5. See discussion infra Part II.
6. See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson, Alex Slabaugh & Karen Eilers Lahey, Reforming Public
Pensions, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 11–12 (2014).
7. See, e.g., id. at 2–3. More than twenty-one million public sector workers have defined benefit plans. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2018 ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC PENSIONS: STATE
& LOCAL TABLES, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2018/econ/aspp/aspp-historicaltables.html [https://perma.cc/W7EP-Y3LH]. This constitutes eighty-six percent of government workers. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS IN THE U.S., MARCH 2019; see also William T. Payne & Stephen M. Pincus, The Constitutional Limitations of Public Employee Pension Reform Legislation, 19 PUB. LAW. 12, 13 (2011)
(“[D]efined benefit plans still make up the bulk of the retirement plans in the public sector.”). There are 297 state-administered funds and 5,123 locally administered defined benefit public pension systems in the United States. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra.
8. See Anenson et al., supra note 6, at 2, 11 (“The gravity of the current crisis has
pushed pension reform . . . to the front of the public policy agenda in each state capital.”);
id. at 12–14 (surveying reforms from 2011–2014 across thirteen states); Amy B. Monahan,
State Fiscal Constitutions and the Law and Politics of Public Pensions, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 172
(compiling reforms from 2001–2012 across eight states).
9. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 2–3 (2016)
(“[S]teps by state and local governments to trim the benefits of public-sector employees
have spawned numerous contract clause challenges in both federal and state courts.”).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”); see Anenson et al., supra note 6, at 17, 21 (comparing Contract
Clause challenges to other constitutional legal barriers to reform like the Due Process
and Takings Clauses). Some states also have constitutional or statutory protections for public pensions. See ELY, supra note 9, at 334 n.136 (listing three states with statutes declaring
participation in a retirement system is a contract and seven states with constitutional provisions protecting public pensions).
11. See T. Leigh Anenson, Linda L. Barkacs & Jennifer K. Gershberg, Constitutional
Limits on Public Pension Reform: New Directions in Law and Legal Reasoning, 15 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2021) (qualitative study of public pension cases from 2014–2019).
12. See id.
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13

provided pension benefits. While the most common basis for the
contract is a state statute, additional sources of the contract right,
among others, may include a local ordinance or even a state consti14
tutional provision.
This Article provides the first study of the use of canons of construction in cases challenging the constitutionality of changes to
government employee pension benefits. In the last six years, there
have been nearly fifty cases disputing retirement reform under the
15
Contract Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. More than
16
half of these decisions employed canons of construction. These
canons influenced the construction of pension legislation at all
17
levels of the judicial system and across fifteen states.
The assessment begins with a general discussion of these interpretive techniques before turning to their operation in public pension litigation. It concentrates on three clashing canons: the remedial (purpose) canon, the “no contract” canon (otherwise known
as the unmistakability doctrine), and the constitutional avoidance
canon. The first canon results in the liberal construction of the
18
statute favorable to government employees. By contrast, the second canon requires strict statutory construction beneficial to gov19
ernment employers. The third canon is likewise advantageous to
20
the government. This research clarifies these conflicting canons
in order to reconcile reasons and results. Through a thick descriptive and normative analysis of canon jurisprudence in the context
of constitutional Contract Clause cases, the Article offers a sustainable vision of pension reform and the court’s role in that process.
Along with improving legislative and judicial decision-making,
the inquiry seeks to extend the theoretical debates in statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation wars, including those about

13. See discussion infra Parts II–III.
14. See Anenson et al., supra note 6, at 21–22.
15. See Anenson et al., supra note 11 (manuscript at 3).
16. See Cranston Firefighters v. Raimondo, 880 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 2018); Taylor v. City
of Gadsden, 767 F.3d 1124, 1133–34 (11th Cir. 2014); Fry v. City of Los Angeles, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 694, 702 (Ct. App. 2016); Marin Ass’n of Pub. Emps. v. Marin Cnty. Emps.’ Ret.
Ass’n, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365, 389 (Ct. App. 2016), review denied, S237460, 2020 WL 5667326
(Cal. Sept. 23, 2020) (mem.); AFT Mich. v. State, 893 N.W.2d 90, 103 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016)
(Saad, J., dissenting); Lake v. State Health Plan for Tchrs. & State Emps., 825 S.E.2d 645,
650 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019); R.I. Council 94 v. Chafee, No. PC 12-3168, 2014 WL 1743149 at *6
(R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014).
17. See id.; infra Appendix. Public employees challenged state and local pension reform
in which judges invoked substantive canons of construction across the following states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Kentucky, Oregon, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Washington. The
issue reached conclusion in eleven state supreme courts.
18. See infra Section II.A.
19. See infra Section II.B.
20. See infra Section II.C.2.

FALL 2020]

Clashing Canons

151

the value and function of canons of construction as well as more
general issues of interpretive uniformity and its status as precedent,
21
have been waged primarily through an evaluation of federal law.
Scholars have devoted insufficient attention to state courts (or state
22
law) where more than ninety percent of litigation takes place.
Therefore, this appraisal fills a gap in an otherwise exhaustive
amount of academic commentary and brings methodological matters in the employment law of government pensions within that
conversation.
Part I provides necessary background on canons of construction.
It explains what they are and what they do. It also frames the controversies over canons as a method of statutory interpretation.
Part II analyzes three competing canons of construction: the
remedial (purpose) canon, the “no contract” canon (unmistakability doctrine), and the constitutional avoidance canon. It charts
their course across the United States in constitutional cases con23
testing public pension reform under the Contract Clause. It describes the canons, documents their sources, and investigates their
justifications along with any qualifications on their application. It
also outlines their evolution outside the new pension cases. Tracing the history of the canons puts their current use in perspective

21. Focusing on federal law, scholars have examined the canons collectively as well as
individually. See, e.g., Baude & Sachs, supra note 2; John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine,
116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003); David Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921 (1992). Many of these studies focus on the U.S. Supreme Court
rather than the lower federal courts. But see FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1st ed. 2008) (providing one of the first studies of the lower
federal courts).
22. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS – JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2018, tbl. 3, tbl. 5 (2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-district-courtsjudicial-business-2018 [https://perma.cc/9BJY-QM29]; COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, TOTAL INCOMING CASES IN STATE Courts, 2007–2016,
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/National-Overview2016/EWSC-2016-Overview-Page-1-Trends.ashx [https://perma.cc/4H6B-NWXF]. Notable
exceptions that address state statutory interpretation are: Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119
YALE L.J. 1750, 1753 (2010), which analyzes methodological developments in the state supreme courts of Oregon, Texas, Connecticut, Washington, and Michigan; and Jacob Scott,
Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341 (2010). For particular
canons by states, see Maura D. Corrigan, Textualism in Action: Judicial Restraint on the Michigan
Supreme Court, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POLIT. 261, 263–64 (2004), which maintains that courts
should adopt textualism to “eliminate unpredictability and confusion” and install “a disciplined interpretative approach”; and William S. Dodge, Presumptions Against Extraterritoriality
in State Law, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1389 (2020), which discusses state presumptions against
extraterritoriality.
23. We use “Contract Clause” throughout our article to refer to both Article I, Section
10, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution and comparable provisions in state constitutions.
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and contributes to a literature that largely lacks longitudinal stud24
ies of particular canons.
Part III evaluates this canonical jurisprudence in light of continuing conversations about statutory interpretation as well as public
pension doctrine and policy. It argues that the “no contract” canon, rather than the remedial canon, is the better choice for assessing the existence of a contract (or the interpretation of its
terms) for public pension benefits. It finds that the constitutional
avoidance canon does scarcely any work other than to establish the
burden of proof. Moreover, it discovers that much of what has
been written about canons under federal law is no longer accurate
at least in the environment of public pension reform litigation. In
particular, courts are using the canons in the service of ascertain25
ing legislative intent. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the
26
methodology also appears to have stare decisis effect. This Part
correspondingly offers improvements in the use of canons going
forward.
The Article concludes that capturing conflicting interpretative
strategies allows for a deeper exploration of the policies in pension
reform litigation and develops a better appreciation of the responsibilities of courts, legislatures, and society. The investigation also
fosters an informed dialogue over the choice of canons and the
circumstances of their operation in the ongoing legal battles about
restructuring pension obligations. It should additionally advance
the use of these canons as analytical tools.
I.

COMPREHENDING CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

Canons of construction are interpretative rules on which judges
rely to discern the meaning of a legal text. 27 They are essentially
simplifying strategies that courts employ in reading written materi28
als like constitutions, statutes, and even contracts.
24. See William S. Dodge, The New Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 133 HARV. L.
REV. 1582, 1588 (2020) (“[T]here are very few longitudinal studies tracing the history of
particular canons.”) (quoting Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 149, 182 n.72 (2001)).
25. Accord Anita Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825,
830 (2017) (finding that the Roberts’ Court honors and not frustrates legislative intent);
infra Part III.
26. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1756; infra Part III.
27. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO
READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 11–27 (2016) (discussing state and federal canons
of construction).
28. See Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in
the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 83 (2015) (calling canons proxies for
judicial expertise); cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 2

FALL 2020]

153

Clashing Canons
29

There are two kinds of interpretative canons. Descriptive (lin30
guistic or textual) canons operate like rules of syntax. Courts use
them to infer the meaning of a statutory provision from its textual
31
structure or context. Familiar Latin maxims fall into this category,
such as expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“to say the one means to
32
exclude the other”). Substantive canons are principles and pre33
sumptions derived from the legal effect of the rule. They are
normative guidelines that direct judges toward a specific result in
34
order to serve a particular policy. Such policies often reflect institutional interests in inter-governmental relations like federalism
35
and separation of powers. Canons also safeguard the rights of
vulnerable and underrepresented groups and the more general
36
right of citizens to due process of law. These policy-based canons
derive from different sources such as common law practices, con37
stitutions, and statutory policies.

(Univ. Chi. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper, Paper No. 01),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.193848.
29. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2005).
30. See, e.g., WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 22-24 (2002) (distinguishing textual from substantive canons).
31. Id. But see Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV.
109, 120 (2010) (“The distinction between linguistic and substantive canons is not always
crisp, for canons that ostensibly advance substantive values are sometimes rationalized as
functionally linguistic.”).
32. See HUHN, supra 30, at 23 (discussing how this common canon is used to draw a
negative implication from a positive statement). Another common textual canon is that “all
laws pertaining to the same subject matter must be interpreted in pari materia, or in reference to each other.” See State v. Williams, 60 So.3d 1189, 1191 (La. 2011) (citation omitted).
33. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 117–18 (describing these interpretative principles as
“promot[ing] policies external to a statute.”).
34. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007, 1018 (1989) (explaining that canons of construction are influenced by public values
rooted in sources outside of the provision at issue, such as the Constitution, common law, or
other statutes); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn its
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992) (calling substantive canons “normative
canons”).
35. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the
Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 37–39 (2008) (explaining
standard arguments in support of the so-called ‘clear statement rule,’ on the grounds this
interpretive canon advances judicial modesty and fosters inter-branch relations.). Some
scholars view all interpretive conventions this way. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocray: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 652 n.308 (1995)
(suggesting that “canons of construction of any type – constitutional or otherwise – can be
justified in separation of powers terms as inherent or ancillary aspects of a court’s interpretative and lawmaking power under Article III[]”); Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence,
and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1422 (2005) (noting some scholars refer to canons as
“buffering devices” designed to avoid “unnecessary interbranch and intergovernmental friction”).
36. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 2, at 459 n.201 (listing rule of lenity and anti-state
preemption canon as derived from the due process clause).
37. See Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1018 (describing the constitution, statutes, and the
common law as three sources of public values in federal law); William N. Eskridge & Philip

154

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 54:1

Courts have cited both descriptive and substantive canons to as38
sist them in construing public pension legislation. Descriptive
canons, however, are less impactful in this setting and are not the
39
subject of this study. Rather, scrutiny centers on the ever40
controversial and conflicting substantive canons.
Substantive canons of construction can differ in their degree of
influence over interpretation. Some serve as rules of thumb for
41
choosing between two reasonable meanings. Other canons are
more forceful and prompt a court to reject the most natural reading of the legal language in favor of an interpretation protective of
42
a policy objective. Depending on their strength, canons can be
43
called tie-breakers, presumptions, or clear statement rules.
Clear statement rules exert arguably the strongest influence on
44
interpretation. This category of canons creates a presumption of

P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
VAND. L. REV. 593, 595 (1992) (suggesting that substantive canons are rooted in “substantive
values drawn from the common law, federal statutes, or the United States Constitution”);
Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation
in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 414 (1993) (describing substantive canons as
“policy-based canons”).
38. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Berg v. Christie is illustrative of arguments containing both types of canons. 137 A.3d 1143 (N.J. 2016). Concerning the textual canon, the
pension participants pointed to the statutory definition of the right that specifically excludes
medical benefits but does not expressly exclude anything else. They claimed this was evidence of a clear legislative intent that cost-of-living allowances (COLAs) were included within this right and could not be reduced. Id. at 1155. The court of last resort was not persuaded. Id. at 1159. The same canon also failed in Rhode Island. A trial court held that an
express right to amend the statutory pension provisions for city employees did not provide
evidence of clear intent to contract for state employees not mentioned. See R.I. Council 94 v.
Chafee, No. PC 12-3168, 2014 WL 1743149 at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014).
39. In the constitutional cases challenging public pension reform, textual canons are
used with less frequency and given less weight than the substantive canons. For recent work
on descriptive canons, see Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 914
(2016) (empirical study suggesting that linguistic canons do not have any greater effect in
ensuring consistent interpretations than tools such as legislative history or references to
congressional intent or purpose); cf. Krishnakumar, supra note 25, at 836 n.44 (advising that
there are opposing views on whether descriptive canons undermine or approximate legislative intent).
40. The literature on substantive canons is immense and offers a variety of perspectives:
theoretical, doctrinal, and empirical. See, e.g., Krishnakumar, supra note 25 (one of the most
recent published works, studying 296 cases from the Roberts Supreme Court decided during
its first six and a half terms).
41. Barrett, supra note 31, at 109 (using “rules of thumb” to designate canons that help
decide between two equally reasonable interpretations); Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1065
(describing public values-based modes of interpretation as “tiebreakers”).
42. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1066; Barrett, supra note 31, at 109–10.
43. See Shapiro, supra note 21, at 934 (noting that distinctions between presumptions
and tie-breakers may be “more of a matter of degree than of kind”); Krishnakumar, supra
note 25, at 835 (listing canon categories as presumptions, liberal or strict construction canons, and clear statement rules).
44. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—
Foreward: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 68–69 (1994) (discussing how some substantive canons have been developed into more powerful clear statement rules).
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a particular meaning that can only be rebutted by a clear statement
45
to the contrary. In requiring an unequivocal announcement before reading the law to reach an exact outcome, courts protect
46
constitutional and other foundational ideas. Well-known examples include waivers of federal or state sovereign immunity or the
47
extraterritorial reach of federal statutes. Assuming courts are consistent in their invocation, the more aggressive canons can also
function as prophylactic rules that require legislatures to stop and
48
think before enacting laws that impact important societal values.
The demand for legislative clarity, so the argument goes, fosters a
greater level of transparency and accountability in the legislative
49
process.
As analyzed in Section II.B, many courts require the legislature
to speak directly and unmistakably before treating legislatively50
created pensions as contracts. Nonetheless, as with other clear
statement canons, the evidence showing that the law is sufficiently
51
clear can vary. Undeniably, the kind and quality of rebuttal evidence amounting to a contract may differ by state and merits inves52
tigation.
Moreover, some canons have conditions of application. While
clear statement rules and other presumptions usually apply at the
beginning of the interpretative enterprise, subject to rebuttal for

45. See, e.g., Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 291 (2011) (quoting Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 139 (2005) (plurality opinion) (“Clear statement rules
ensure Congress does not, by broad or general language, legislate on sensitive topics inadvertently or without due deliberation”)); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solomino, 501
U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (explaining that clear statement canons apply “only to the protection
of weighty and constant values, be they constitutional . . . or otherwise . . . .”).
46. John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399,
403–04 (2010) (explaining that clear statement rules conserve constitutional and other values by imposing a “clarity tax” on Congress); see also Stephenson, supra note 35, at 11 (advancing a “stronger claim that judicial imposition of additional enactment costs on legislatures enables courts to reduce their comparative informational disadvantage” under certain
circumstances).
47. See generally Dodge, supra note 24 (illustrating the history of the extraterritorial canon).
48. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 175 (observing that substantive canons can press the
legislature on a point when important societal values are at stake); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549,
1608 (2000) (maintaining that “clear statement rules may prompt the “sober second
thought” for legislatures in enacting statutes that implicate those values).
49. See Stephenson, supra note 35, at 2; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 458–59 (arguing that
canons promote superior lawmaking).
50. See discussion infra Section II.B.
51. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.d. and II.C. Some scholars only call a canon a
clear statement rule if rebuttal must be express as opposed to implied. See, e.g., Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 44.
52. See discussion infra Section II.B.
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clarity, other canons enter the search for meaning later. They are
relevant only if the legal text is ambiguous and susceptible to more
54
than one meaning. This prerequisite to a canon’s application
makes the distinction between plain and ambiguous language par55
amount. There is not always clarity (or even an explanation) as to
when legal language becomes appropriately ambiguous for the ap56
plication of a particular canon.
Certain canons may additionally be subject matter-specific. For
example, when legislation affects vulnerable groups like veterans
or Native Americans, canons direct courts to construe statutory
57
language in the group’s favor. There are also canons that focus
on particular fields, such as tax law and constitutional law, to simi58
lar effect. There are even more specific default rules operating as
doctrines, including the Chevron (administrative) canon and the
59
equity canon. The “no contract” canon (otherwise known as the
unmistakability doctrine), analyzed in Section II.B., falls within this
60
category as well. Other canons apply more broadly across the
board. In many situations, characterizing a case or issue as of a cer-

53. Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA under the Remedial Purpose Canon:
Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 199, 245 (1996)
(discussing temporal difference in the application of canons).
54. Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d 784, 793 (1st Cir. 1996) (clarifying that a
canon of construction is apposite only when the legislature “has blown an uncertain trumpet. . . .”); see also Barrett, supra note 31, at 123 (explaining that textualists view statutory
ambiguity as legislative delegation where policy analysis in the exercise of a judge’s interpretative discretion is acceptable).
55. See discussion infra Part III.
56. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 22, at 1842 (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court currently is struggling with the question of “how ambiguity is discerned. . . .”); Bruce A. Markell,
Bankruptcy, Lenity, and the Statutory Interpretation of Cognate Civil and Criminal Statutes, 69 IND.
L.J. 335, 346 (1994) (“What is controversial, and not so simple, are the procedures used to
find ambiguity.”).
57. See, e.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 441 (2011) (“We have long applied
‘the canon that provisions for benefits to members of the Armed Services are to be construed in the beneficiaries’ favor.’ ”) (quoting King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U.S. 215,
220 n.9 (1991)); Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (“When
we are faced with . . . two possible constructions, our choice between them must be dictated
by a principle deeply rooted in this Court’s Indian jurisprudence: ‘[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.’ ”) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)).
58. See Steve R. Johnson, The Canon That Tax Penalties Should Be Strictly Construed, 3 NEV.
L.J. 495, 495–96 (2003) (reviewing various tax canons). See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp And Woof Of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches
In Tax Law And Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231 (2009) (comparing how the Supreme
Court has used canons of construction in construing tax statutes and workplace statutes).
For the constitutional avoidance canon, see infra Section II.C. and Part III.
59. See generally T. Leigh Anenson, Statutory Interpretation, Judicial Discretion, and Equitable
Defenses, 79 UNIV. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2017) (identifying and justifying the U.S. Supreme Court’s
assumption of equitable defenses in federal statutes); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 351–52 (1994) (arguing that textualism
is contextual).
60. See infra Section II.B. and Part III.
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tain type can determine the availability of these specialty canons.
The remedial canon, discussed in Section II.A, is invoked regularly
in the interpretation of public pension law and can defy definition
62
for these reasons.
Furthermore, given the wide variety of canons and contexts,
conflicting canons often arise in a given case. This conflict can lead
63
to a hierarchy among the canons under certain circumstances. A
constant criticism of the judicial use of canons is the existence of
64
competing canons of construction. Critics complain that the
availability of conflicting canons does not advance useful guidance
65
for decision-making. Instead, they claim that canons are simply
66
conclusory of results reached on other grounds, or worse, manip67
ulations that mask the real reason for judicial action.
Critiques of substantive canons generally take two forms: the au68
thority objection and the competency objection. The challenge to
a court’s authority to invoke canons of construction is the fear of
69
impinging on democratic values. The usual refrain is that substantive canons are undemocratic judge-made rules that defeat leg70
islative intent. The force of this objection is influenced by interpretative orientation, including the perception of the judicial role

61. HUHN, supra note 30, at 100.
62. See infra Section II.A. and Part III.
63. See generally Sunstein, supra note 2 (developing a system of canons).
64. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–
1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1100 (2001) (discussing Karl Llewellyn’s “nasty list” showing
every canon to have a counter-canon negating it).
65. See, e.g., HUHN, supra note 30, at 101 (explaining that scholars disagree on whether
they are useful guides or merely conclusory).
66. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 CHI. L. REV. 671, 679 (1999) (explaining that some scholars critique judicial use of
canons as “window-dressing” to justify conclusions reached through other interpretative
tools).
67. See Krishnakumar, supra note 25, at 837 (“[N]umerous commentators writing over a
wide time span have maintained that judges use substantive canons strategically. . . .”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 676 (1990) (arguing that
Justice Scalia uses substantive canons selectively and arbitrarily).
68. See generally Anenson, supra note 59 (assessing authority and competency objections
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s inclusion of equitable defenses in silent statutes).
69. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J.
353, 389–90 (1989) (“[J]udicial interpretation of statutes raises a problem of legitimacy, i.e.,
justification for unelected and unrepresented judges making law in a representative democracy.”); infra Part III.
70. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 37, at 636–40 (discussing ordinary and superstrong presumptions as counter-majoritarian to the extent “they permit the Court to
override probable congressional preference in statutory interpretation in favor of norms
and values favored by the Court”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A
Study in Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 744 (1992) (identifying concern that substantive canons are unsound because they may be judicial policymaking through the guise of statutory interpretation).
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either as faithful agents or cooperative partners with the legisla71
ture. It also depends, to some extent, on the strength of the can72
on in practice.
73
The competency objection largely concerns rule of law values.
Detractors denounce “loose canons” that are decontextualized
from the surrounding circumstances and that apply without regard
74
for the type of statute at issue. Ideally, canons should foster clari75
ty, consistency, and certainty in interpretation. In reality, in spite
of the slippery nature of the ground rules for interpretation (some
of which is inherent in the process of legal reasoning and the in76
cremental way of judging complex cases), canons continue to influence the interpretative process and, ultimately, case outcomes.
Substantive canons, in particular, express value choices courts
make in discerning the meaning of the law. Sometimes canons are
rationalized as a proxy for legislative intent, even if they are also
justified on grounds independent of the policies expressed in the
77
written law. Recognition of a canon signals the types of interests
that courts take into account when a text is open to more than one

71. The classification and validity of interpretative conventions is subject to varying philosophies of the judicial role in statutory interpretation. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 110
(discussing debate between dynamic statutory interpreters who view courts as cooperative
partners with Congress and textualists who view courts as faithful agents); id. at 114 (“[T]he
debate between textualists and dynamists about the strength of that norm [of legislative supremacy] is a critical one in recent scholarship.”); Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective
Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 528–42 (1998) (reviewing debate and dividing factions into intentionalists, purposiveness, textualists, and dynamicists).
72. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 37, at 636–40 (discussing ordinary and superstrong presumptions as counter-majoritarian to the extent “they permit the [U.S. Supreme] Court to override probably congressional preference in statutory interpretation in
favor of norms and values favored by the Court”); Shapiro, supra note 21, at 925–26 (discussing how “legislative purpose can be thwarted by excessive devotion to the status quo”).
73. Eskridge, supra note 66, at 678 (listing rule of law aspirations for canons to be objective, consistent, and transparent); Schacter, supra note 35, at 650 (describing competency
critiques contending that judges lack the skills and resources to create and use certain kinds
of normative canons).
74. See Edward L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of Practical Reason:
A Response to Farber and Ross, 45 VAND. L. REV. 579, 583 (1992) (“They are loose canons,
showing up at unpredictable times and rolling about in unpredictable directions. Worse
than their unpredictability is their oppressive noise and the ever-present danger of explosion.”).
75. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 66, at 678–82; see also Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1023
(discussing how interpretation to preserve the traditional separation of responsibilities in
government has been understood in institutional competence terms).
76. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 37, at 596 (“We agree that the malleability of the
canons prevents them from constraining the Court or forcing certain results in statutory
interpretation through deductive reasoning from first canonical principles.”); Lawrence M.
Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 144 (1998) (explaining that it is
unrealistic to expect consistency from methods of statutory interpretation, but that a
“framework . . . to structure disputes so that disagreements focus on the issues” is doable).
77. Barrett, supra note 31, at 110; see also Ross, supra note 34, at 563 (claiming that substantive canons reflect judicial rather than legislative policy concerns).
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78

interpretation. Hence, the application of a particular canon or set
of canons helps to pinpoint the considerations that judges evaluate
79
in their decisions.
It bears repeating that the rich literature assessing various canons and other interpretative techniques under federal statutory law
does not offer much insight into their use and effect under state
80
law. Yet these methodologies are alive and well in the state law
sphere. In the recent crop of cases challenging public pension reform on constitutional grounds, the impact of substantive canons
81
has been substantial. Judges have relied on them when interpreting government pension obligations, and both sides of a dispute
82
have addressed substantive canons when making their arguments.
Though there are potentially fifty different ways of employing a
given set of substantive canons, it seems worthwhile to attempt to
bring some form of horizontal coherence (at least within the government pension space) to the judicial discourse. Given the recent
studies of canons generally, it is also useful to compare and contrast the operation of substantive canons in the interpretation of
state and local pension law with the methodological stance of
83
courts construing other federal and state legislation. The next
Part examines the three competing canons employed in contests
over government pension reform under the Contract Clause.
II. COMPETING CANONS AND PUBLIC PENSION LEGISLATION
In assessing whether statutory changes to public pension benefits violate the Contract Clause, courts must first ascertain whether
the alteration affected benefits that were terms of a pre-existing
contract. 84 In making this determination, courts have applied competing canons of construction.
Certain courts have treated public pensions as corrective and,
accordingly, applied the canon that remedial statutes should be
85
liberally construed. The remedial canon reinforces a finding of a
prior contract and, as a result, benefits employees challenging re-

78. See Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1011 (describing canons as an antecedent to modern
public values analysis).
79. See discussion infra Part III.
80. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1753–54.
81. See discussion infra Parts II and III.
82. Id.
83. See generally Gluck, supra note 22 (considering courts of last resort in five states);
Krishnakumar, supra note 25 (analyzing U.S. Supreme Court cases).
84. See Anenson et al., supra note 6, at 21.
85. See discussion infra Section II.A.
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86

form legislation. Other courts, in contrast, strictly construe public
pension law pursuant to the canon that legislatures generally make
87
policies and not contracts. This “no contract” canon (otherwise
known as the unmistakability doctrine) weighs heavily in favor of
88
upholding reforms to pension systems. Another canon commonly
invoked on the contract issue is that courts will avoid constitutional
questions by assuming, at least initially, that legislation complies
89
with the U.S. or state constitution. The constitutional avoidance
canon likewise supports a judgment that pension reforms withstand constitutional challenge.
While a few courts have considered (or at least noted) the avail90
ability of contradictory canons of construction, most have not.
Sharp divisions remain among the courts of both a single jurisdic91
tion and the several states. A crossfire of canons is currently occurring in the appellate courts of California—an influential state
92
for conceptualizing pensions as contracts. The conflicting canons
93
question also reached the highest court of New Jersey.
The following discussion explores these contrasting approaches.
It documents canon use in the new pension cases in an effort to
determine their place and impact in assessing the constitutionality
of reforms. It additionally seeks to enhance the quality of the debate over the relative merits of competing canons and to contribute to a better appreciation of background assumptions in state
statutory interpretation.
A. Remedial Canon
The remedial canon, or “remedial purpose” canon, is a judicially
created substantive canon of construction under which remedial
statutes are construed broadly to effectuate their remedial purposes. In a Contract Clause challenge to public pension reform, the

86. See id.
87. See discussion infra Section II.B.
88. See id.
89. See discussion infra Section II.C.
90. See, e.g., Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1150 (N.J. 2016) (considering tension between the remedial canon and “no contract” clear statement rule); Alameda Cnty. Deputy
Sheriff’s Ass’n v. Alameda Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787, 804 (Ct. App.
2018) (noting incongruence between the constitutional avoidance canon and the remedial
canon), rev’d on other grounds, 470 P.3d 85 (Cal. 2020).
91. See discussion infra Parts II–III.
92. See discussion infra Section II.A.2.; Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The “California Rule” and Its Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1036, 1051–69
(2012) (tracing the ninety-year history of the California rule and counting twelve states that
followed it); Watson, supra note 53, at 253 (using the term “crossfire”).
93. See discussion infra Section II.A.2. and Part III.
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application of this norm makes it more likely that a court will find
that employees have a contractual right to their legislatively provided pension benefits.
1. Overview
Rooted in the idea of purposive construction from medieval
England, the remedial canon arose in America to assist judges with
the integration of statutory enactments into the then preexisting
94
and pervasive common law regime. The term “remedial” was in
reference to legislation that either supplemented or corrected a
95
defect in the common law. With the rise of the regulatory state,
however, judges began to portray legislation as remedial without
96
any indication of the prevailing private law. Courts now determine whether a particular enactment is deserving of liberal con97
struction by an ad hoc inquiry into its remedial nature.
Unmoored from its origins in contradistinction to the common
law, the canon’s theoretical basis shifted and courts extended its
98
coverage to a variety of statutes. In consequence, a recurring
94. See Watson, supra note 53, at 229–30 (sketching the history of the remedial canon);
Barrett, supra note 31, at 154 n.216 (citing federal cases in the Founding Era using the remedial canon). The remedial canon has been traced as far back as 16th century England
where Sir Edward Coke announced the “mischief rule” in Heydon’s Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep.
637, 638. Coke pronounced that a judge should ascertain the problem that the legislature
meant to be corrected for which the common law did not provide and construe the statute
in light of that purpose. See L.H. LaRue, Statutory Interpretation: Lord Coke Revisited, 48 U. PITT.
L. REV. 733 (1987). This form of purposive construction was then transformed by Blackstone
into the remedial purpose canon in use today. See William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory
Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 806–08 (1985) (explaining that Blackstone’s Commentaries were readily adopted and expanded by American courts
and commentators).
95. The canon was in tension with, and served as a corrective to, the much-maligned
canon that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed. See Watson, supra note 53, at 230–31; see also WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY
AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 101–02 (1999). The remedial canon applied
even if the statute created rights unknown to the common law and, accordingly, added a
right rather than merely a remedy. See, e.g., Koepp v. National Enameling and Stamping Co.,
139 N.W. 179, 185 (Wis. 1912); Barbara Page, Statutes in the Common Law: The Canon as an
Analytical Tool, 1956 WISC. L. REV. 78, 104.
96. See Watson, supra note 53, at 231.
97. See id. at 236–41 (listing a variety of federal statutes that courts have deemed remedial and construed such legislation liberally).
98. A leading treatise on statutory interpretations lists numerous categories of mostly
federal law where at least some courts have utilized the remedial canon. Federal courts have
invoked the canon to protect the public from nefarious business practices including antitrust, securities, and unfair competition regulation. 3A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 70.04, at 216–20 (7th ed.
2008). The canon has been applied in interpreting legislation designed to promote public
health, id. at § 70.02, at 235–43, and safety, id. at § 70.04, at 255–70. They have additionally
used the canon in protecting particular groups against various forms of discrimination, id. at
§ 74, at 351–404, or by providing them with a cause of action for compensatory damages
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complaint about the remedial canon is uncertainty about the
99
meaning of “remedial.” Adding to this confusion is that courts do
100
not often describe the attributes of a remedial statute. A study in
one state, for instance, faults the canon for failing to explain scores
of decisions given that the same legislation is sometimes deemed
101
remedial and sometimes not. In fact, scholars of all theoretical
perspectives have criticized the indeterminacy of the canon’s
102
boundaries. For the same reason, judges have also expressed reservations about the canon. 103
Along with confusion over the remedial canon’s coverage is the
unpredictable extent of its application. Critics often point out the
104
lack of specificity in ascertaining what “liberal” means. On the
whole, to what degree should the court stretch a statute’s mean-

such as with consumer legislation. See James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons
From Judges Interpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 51 (1994) (“[T]he canon favoring liberal construction of remedial statutes is selectively applied and largely without
meaning in practice.”).
99. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS 364–66 (2012) (arguing that the canon is superfluous because every statute
is remedial in seeking to remedy an unjust or inconvenient situation); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 156 (1990) (calling
the remedial canon “largely useless”).
100. See, e.g., Page, supra note 95, at 103. Under federal law at least, a remedial statute is
usually exclusive of criminal or other penal statutes where the operation of the longstanding rule of lenity instructs judges to strictly construe such legislation in favor of the accused. See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 895, 895
(2004). But many states’ legislatures have abolished this rule of construction. See Note, Alan
R. Romero, Interpretative Directions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 211, 216 n.24 (1994) (listing Arizona, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah).
But see id. at 216 n.26 (listing Florida, Georgia, Ohio, and Pennsylvania as states that have
codified the common law rule requiring strict construction of penal statutes).
101. Page, supra note 95, at 103.
102. See Watson, supra note 53, at 235 (“[T]he remedial purpose canon has been criticized for being imprecise in terms of its coverage by proponents of legal realism, public
choice theory, new textualism, and public values.”); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 459 n.201
(concluding that the legal system would be better off without it).
103. See Standard Oil of Conn., Inc. vs. Adm’r, Unemployment Comp. Act, 134 A.3d 581,
608–09 (Conn. 2016) (reiterating the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement that whether a
statute is remedial is often misused and misunderstood); Blankfeld v. Richmond Health
Care, Inc., 902 So. 2d 296, 304 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005) (Farmer, C.J., concurring) (“All these
variations on remedial rob the canon of any real interpretive weight.”); Adam Bain, Determining the Preemptive Effect of Federal Law on State Statutes of Repose, 43 U. BALT. L. REV. 119, 147
n.146 (2014) (citing federal circuit court opinions expressing dissatisfaction with the remedial canon); Brian M. Saxe, Note, When a Rigid Textualism Fails: Damages for ADA Employment
Retaliation, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 555, 588 (citing federal cases authored by Seventh Circuit
Judges Easterbrook and Posner calling the remedial canon “one of the least persuasive” or
“useless” canons).
104. See, e.g., In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) (“This
[canon] tells us the direction to move but does not help us figure out how far to go. . .”);
Standard Oil, 134 A.3d at 608–09 (explicating unpredictability in determining how liberal to
interpret a remedial statute).
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105

ing? The remedial canon is therefore controversial due to its in106
definite scope and uncertain effect.
Nevertheless, criticisms of the canon can be overstated. Professor David Shapiro concluded that the remedial canon has a more
107
limited scope than its broad wording would suggest. Similarly,
Professor Blake Watson observed that courts circumscribed its use
in a number of situations: when the language is plain (clear), when
it would upset a legislatively crafted compromise of policy goals,
when reliance on the canon clashes with other interpretive principles, and when aggressive interpretation would disserve the reme108
dial objectives. Furthermore, the fact that the remedial canon is
often difficult to apply has not deterred courts from invoking the
canon on a regular basis. Notwithstanding the lack of a precise definition of “remedial” or “liberal,” the leading treatise on statutory
109
interpretation explains that the canon is “firmly established.”
What is more, there is consensus on the kinds of statutes for
which the remedial canon is uniformly accepted, although it is not
universally applied in every case. One such area is employment law.
No doubt due to the canon’s historical origins in updating and
correcting the common law, worker safety legislation is deemed
110
remedial and subject to liberal construction. In many states, legislatures codified the remedial canon as part of the workers’ compensation statutes to ensure that the law would be construed in fa111
vor of injured employees. State legislatures have also statutorily
mandated liberal construction of unemployment compensation
112
laws. Other work-related statutes have received similar treatment
113
by judicial designation. Worker safety and unemployment compensation are remedial in protecting workers from exploitation by

105. This complaint gets lodged generally against any form of liberal or strict construction. See generally Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal Construction, 64
ALB. L. REV. 9 (2000).
106. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 581, 582 (1989) (“How ‘liberal’ is liberal, and how ‘strict’ is strict?”).
107. Shapiro, supra note 21, at 938 (“Though a comprehensive study of all the decisions
remains to be done, my own reading in the field suggests that the ‘remedial’ canon has been
given far less scope than its broad wording would suggest . . . .”).
108. Watson, supra note 53, at 205–06.
109. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 98, § 60:1, at 250–52 (explaining that expressions of
the remedial canon “appear over and over in judicial opinions”). Contra Nina A. Mendelson,
Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. REV. 71, 110–23 (2018) (describing abandonment of the
canon that remedial statutes shall be liberally construed).
110. Page, supra note 95, at 103.
111. See Thomas S. Cook, Workers’ Compensation and Stress Claims: Remedial Intent and Restrictive Application, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 879, 881 n.14 (1987).
112. Page, supra note 95, at 104.
113. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 98, § 73.02, at 324–42 (listing employment laws subject
to remedial canon).
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employers (and shielding society from stepping in with other support programs). Perhaps because pensions were offered initially to
injured police officers, laws typically subject to the remedial canon
114
include employee pensions and other benefits.
Despite the frequent application and pervasiveness of the remedial canon, there has been no comprehensive state-by-state study of
115
it (or any other canon) in employment law. And more specifically, there has been no research on the extent to which judges have
invoked the remedial canon to interpret state and local pension
legislation.
2. Application
Courts are at a crossroads concerning the role of the remedial
canon in ascertaining whether public pension legislation constitutes a contract. As government employees continue to challenge
ongoing pension reforms, clashing canons will likely remain a recurring problem. The ensuing analysis juxtaposes canon warfare in
two states: New Jersey and California. In New Jersey, the canon
campaign recently concluded. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
was the first court in the country to directly consider (and reject)
the applicability of the remedial canon in cases contesting the con116
stitutionality of public pension reform. In California, there is a
controversy over the choice of canons, including the use of the
remedial canon in public pension reform litigation. Three intermediate state appellate courts have basically chosen three different
117
canons. The Supreme Court of California itself has not been
consistent in its use of the remedial canon in the public pension
118
context.
In Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n v. Alameda County Employ119
ees’ Retirement Ass’n, a California court of appeals addressed the

114. Id.; see also Kross v. W. Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying remedial canon in interpreting ERISA). See generally ROBERT L. CLARK, LEE A. CRAIG & JACK W.
WILSON, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2003) (discussing
the evolution of public pensions); Note, Contractual Aspects of Pension Plan Modification, 56
COLUM. L. REV. 251, 251 (1956) (“Since the establishment of pension for Revolutionary War
veterans by the Continental Congress and several states, governmental pensions have been
extended first to policemen and firemen, later to teachers and finally to all classes of governmental employees.”).
115. Scholars have analyzed the use of canons across federal workplace law. See generally
Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 29 (empirical study).
116. Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1151 (N.J. 2016); see infra notes 153–163
117. See infra notes 119–136 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 119–152 and accompanying text.
119. 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787 (Ct. App. 2018), rev’d on other grounds, 470 P.3d 85 (Cal. 2020).
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constitutionality of pension reform under the Contract Clause.
The court set forth the remedial canon in the standard of review
section at the outset of the opinion, acknowledged a conflict between that canon and the constitutional avoidance canon, and
121
then never referred to it again. The appellate court relied on a
California Supreme Court public pension case to explain the di122
mensions of the remedial canon. It explicitly tied the canon to
legislative intent and limited its use to ambiguous (as opposed to
123
clear) statutes.
The court spent much of its opinion on an issue preliminary to
the contract question. It reconciled the prior and new pension
statutes to assess whether or not the latter legislation actually
124
changed the law. As such, its primary focus was determining the
meaning of the earlier legislation and not deciding whether that
125
statute amounted to a contractual promise.
Just a few years before the recognition of the remedial canon in
126
Alameda County, however, two other California appellate courts
omitted any reference to it in assessing whether public pension reforms violated the Contract Clause. Instead, they resorted to con120. Id. at 804. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the federal and state constitutions. Id.
at 787. The court of appeals appeared to decide the contract element of the Contract Clause
test under the California Constitution. Id. at 824–32.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Ventura Cnty. Dep. Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Bd. of Ret., 940 P.2d 891, 895 (Cal.
1997)). Ventura was apt because it dealt with a similar issue of what payments were required
by the pension statute to be included in the calculation of the employee benefit. Id.
123. The California Court of Appeals explained:
When the language of a statute is ambiguous—as Ventura declared sections 31460
and 31461 to be in many respects—our “primary responsibility” when engaging in
judicial construction “is to carry out the intent of the Legislature to the extent
possible.” In addition—since the task of statutory interpretation here at hand involves the pension rights of legacy members of CCCERA, ACERA, and MCERA—
we must keep in mind that “[p]ension legislation must be liberally construed and
applied to the end that the beneficent results of such legislation may be
achieved.” Thus, while our judicial construction “must be consistent with the clear
language and purpose of the statute,” it is also true that “[a]ny ambiguity or uncertainty in the meaning of pension legislation must be resolved in favor of the
pensioner.”
Id. (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 809. The key question concerned which items were “compensation earnable”
under the statute to be included in the pension benefit. Id. at 809–24. Four items of potential pensionable compensation were at issue: in-service “leave cash outs” (payments for unused vacation, annual leave, personal leave, sick leave, or compensatory time off), terminal
pay, on-call premium pay, and pay to enhance the retirement benefit. See id.
125. The appellate court found that certain exclusions were clarifications of pre-existing
law and other exclusions changed the law. Id. at 810, 813–14. As to the latter, it determined
that a contract existed. Id. at 821, 823–25. The Supreme Court of California agreed that the
components of earnable compensation were part of an employee’s contract right, but held
that the modifications were justified to stem abuses of the pension system. Alameda Cnty.
Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n v. Alameda Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n, 470 P.3d 85 (Cal. 2020).
126. Alameda Cnty., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787, rev’d on other grounds, 470 P.3d 85 (Cal. 2020).
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trary canons. Marin Ass’n of Public Employees v. Marin County Employ127
ees’ Retirement Ass’n was an almost identical case to Alameda County
that had been decided earlier by a different division of the same
district without resort to the remedial canon. 128 Yet the court
skipped the same issue alleged in the complaint about whether the
129
reforms were declarative of existing law. Alternatively, it engaged
in a purely constitutional inquiry and applied the avoidance can130
on. In another California district involving a constitutional contest over pension reform, an appellate court in Fry v. City of Los An131
132
In
geles also omitted any reference to the remedial canon.
ruling that there was no guaranteed contract right, the court of
appeals did not liberally construe the prior pension provisions in
133
favor of the employee. To the contrary, the court utilized the
opposite presumption by invoking the idea that legislative bodies
134
generally make policies rather than contracts. The appellate
court relied on Retired Employees Ass’n of Orange County, Inc. v. Coun135
ty of Orange, a 2011 decision by the California Supreme Court. In
that case, the supreme court recognized for the first time this idea
embodied in the unmistakability doctrine (outlined in the next
136
section) in pension reform litigation. In 2019, the Supreme
Court of California reiterated the “no contract” canon and upheld

127. Marin Ass’n of Pub. Emps. v. Marin Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365,
389 (Ct. App. 2016), review denied, S237460, 2020 WL 5667326 (Cal. Sept. 23, 2020) (mem.).
128. Id. The lawsuits stemmed from the same pension statute. The challenged changes
to county retirement systems were enacted by the California Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act of 2013 (PEPRA).
129. See Alameda Cnty., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 829 (mentioning the different approach in
Marin).
130. Id. at 830 (“[T]he Marin court eschewed analysis of the many issues of statutory
construction with which we have wrestled here, instead conducting a purely constitutional
inquiry into the vested rights implications of AB 197.”); id. (clarifying that Marin undertook
a constitutional contracts analysis “without determining what the changes to section 31461
effected by PEPRA actually are. . . .”). The appellate court in Marin found that the modifications made to pensions in the reform statute were constitutionally permissible because what
remained was still a “reasonable” pension. Marin Ass’n of Pub. Emps., 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 393.
131. Fry v. City of Los Angeles, 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694 (Ct. App. 2016).
132. Id.
133. See id. at 702–05 (holding there was no right to a board-determined subsidy). At
issue was the construction of a charter amendment and two ordinances concerning the authority of the City Council and Board of Pension Commissioners to grant health insurance
subsidies contributed by the city to firefighter and police retirees’ insurance premiums. Id.
at 697, 700, 704. A subsequent city ordinance froze increases and the employees sued challenging the change as an impairment of contract under the California Constitution. Id. at
700.
134. Id. at 702–704.
135. Retired Emps. Ass’n of Orange Cnty., Inc. v. County of Orange, 266 P.3d 287 (Cal.
2011).
136. Id. at 295.

FALL 2020]

Clashing Canons

167

pension reform in Cal Fire Local 2881 v. Cal. Public Employees’ Retire137
ment System.
Despite the court’s recent recitation of the “no contract” canon,
the battle in California does not appear to have been won. The
competition among canons was not argued or even acknowledged
138
in Cal Fire. Besides, the California Supreme Court has traditionally tied the remedial canon to the object of the legislation that is to
benefit the pensioner. 139 This unifies the application of the canon
with the codification of general interpretative instructions emphasizing a court’s role in reading California statutes as they are clearly
written and, if ambiguous, ascertaining the intent of the legisla140
ture. Predictably, many of the cases applying the canon involved
public pension beneficiaries. These were lawsuits by widows of deceased peace officers or firemen seeking to prove that their spous141
es had qualified to receive a pension.
The court’s first decision to apparently articulate the remedial
142
canon in construing public pension legislation was O'Dea v. Cook,
143
involving the widow of a deceased policeman. In that case, the
137. Cal Fire Local 2881 v. Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 435 P.3d 433, 450 (Cal. 2019).
138. The court also carved out an exception to the presumption against contract for
public pensions statutes. See infra note 270 and accompanying text. A way to resolve the remedial and “no contract” canon under California law may be to argue that the rationale of
the remedial canons was recognized in the creation of the exception to the “no contract”
canon. This resolution, however, is not at all clear from the case law.
139. See, e.g., Terry v. City of Berkeley, 263 P.2d 833, 835 (Cal. 1953); McKeag v. Bd. of
Pension Comm’rs of City of Los Angeles, 132 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1942) (“In ascertaining the
intent and meaning of the charter provision, a liberal construction should be indulged in to
carry out the beneficial purposes aimed at. . .” (internal quotations and citations omitted));
Neeley v. Bd. of Ret., 111 Cal. Rptr. 841, 844 (Ct. App. 1974) (“[T]his rule of liberal construction is applied for the purpose of effectuating the obvious legislative intent [citation]
and should not blindly be followed so as to eradicate the clear language and purpose of the
statute . . . .”).
140. The California Supreme Court in Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Board of Retirement explained:
The function of the court in construing a statute “is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has
been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted. . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.)
Therefore, if a statute is unambiguous, it must be applied according to its terms.
Judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. When statutory construction is necessary, the court’s primary responsibility is to carry out the intent of the
Legislature to the extent possible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1859).
940 P.2d 891, 897 (Cal. 1997).
141. The issue concerned whether the employee’s death was in the performance of his
job. See Casserly v. City of Oakland, 12 P.2d 425, 425 (Cal. 1932) (liberally construing city
charter granting pension to widow of fireman killed in performance of duty); Dillard v. City
of Los Angeles, 127 P.2d 917, 920 (Cal. 1942) (remedial canon applied to place the widow
of a deceased police officer, and her child, on the pension rolls); see also Lyons v. Hoover,
258 P.2d 4, 5 (Cal. 1953) (reciting remedial canon to assist in the correct calculation of the
pension of a widow of a retired policeman receiving disability pension).
142. O’Dea v. Cook, 169 P. 366 (Cal. 1917).
143. Id. at 367.
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court cited to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Walton v. Cot144
ton, which determined that grandchildren of Revolutionary War
veterans were pension beneficiaries under federal law. 145 The Court
in Walton did not enunciate the remedial canon per se. But the sentiment was the same in finding congressional intent to grant pen146
sions based on gratitude for these soldiers and their families. The
liberal construction of pension law is deemed especially appropri147
ate when the employee served in the military. This favorable
treatment for military service dovetails nicely with the rationale of
other substantive canons that protect certain groups such as veter148
ans.
So, one could argue that the California Supreme Court has
shifted from a broad to a strict construction of pension law. In the
early twentieth century, the court reliably endorsed the remedial
149
canon favoring employees in interpreting pension legislation.
Certainly, during the Great Depression, California’s highest court
was confident enough in the remedial canon to announce: “Courts
are practically unanimous in holding that the words should be given a broad and liberal construction in order that the humane pur150
pose of the enactment may be realized.” Conversely, a century
151
later, the court endorsed a restrictive reading. There has not
been an attempt to reconcile these (potentially) divergent interpretations of pension law, no doubt because the choice of canons
has not been made an issue in the state’s public pension decisions
There is considerable confusion in the intermediate appellate
courts, with only one in three public pension cases challenging reforms under the Contract Clause even mentioning the remedial

144. Walton v. Cotton, 60 U. S. 355 (1856).
145. Id. at 358.
146. Id.; see also Gibson v. City of San Diego, 156 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1945) (applying remedial
canon in favor of fireman and member of the military to interpret timing of war service
credit in city charter). The Supreme Court was also persuaded that grandchildren were pension beneficiaries because it was consistent with the construction of wills. See Walton, 60 U. S.
at 358.
147. Cable v. State ex rel. Okla. Police Pension & Ret. Bd., 31 P.3d 392, 397 (Okla. Ct.
App. 2001) (“The liberal construction of pension statutes is especially significant when addressing military service credit, because laws regarding ‘employees who enter the armed
forces in time of war or emergency are favored.’ “); Quam v. City of Fargo, 43 N.W.2d 292,
295 (N.D. 1950) (quoting Gibson, 156 P.2d at 740); see also Raney v. Bd. of Admin. of Ret.
Sys., 298 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tenn. 1957) (liberally construing statute allowing credit for military service).
148. See Chadwick J. Harper, Note, Give Veterans the Benefit of the Doubt: Chevron, Auer,
and the Veteran’s Canon, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931 (2019); discussion infra Part III.
149. See supra notes 139–145 and accompanying text.
150. Casserly v. City of Oakland, 12 P.2d 425, 425 (Cal. 1932) (pension statute).
151. See supra notes 135–136 and accompanying text; infra Part III.
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152

canon. Consequently, California has two lines of precedent supported by its highest court.
The dispute over these canons could be resolved by confining
the remedial canon to non-constitutional cases. It was precisely this
factual distinction that led the New Jersey Supreme Court in Berg v.
153
Christie to reject the remedial canon in resolving a constitutional
contract challenge to its pension reform statute. 154 At issue was
whether the suspension of cost-of-living allowances (COLAs) contravened a term of the contract conferred under an earlier enacted
155
“non-forfeitable right” statute. The retirees argued that the prior
statute should be read pursuant to the remedial canon as a binding
156
contract to continue receiving COLAs. New Jersey courts have
considered pension statutes to be remedial in character and deserving of a liberal construction “in favor of the persons intended
157
to be benefited thereby.” The government advocated for a strict
reading of the legislation via the “no contract” canon (unmistaka158
bility doctrine). It maintained (and New Jersey’s highest court
ultimately agreed) that legislative intent to contract must be “clear159
ly and unequivocally expressed.”
The Supreme Court of New Jersey took note of the tension be160
tween the canons and emphasized that the choice of canon “pro161
foundly affects” the result. The court then proceeded to distinguish the remedial canon cases, explaining that they involved
162
coverage issues under existing statutes. Applying the “no contract” clear statement rule, considered in Section II.B, it held that
the statute, which granted a non-forfeitable right for government
employees to receive benefits “provided under the laws governing
163
the retirement system or fund,” did not include pension COLAs.
The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on precedent to justify its
analysis and did not inquire into the underlying philosophy of the
152. See supra notes 119–121 and 128–132 and accompanying text.
153. Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143 (N.J. 2016).
154. Id. at 1151.
155. Id. at 1147.
156. Id. at 1151.
157. See id.; see, e.g., Klumb v. Bd. of Educ., 970 A.2d 354, 366 (N.J. 2009) (quoting Geller
v. N.J. Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Pensions & Annuity Fund, 252 A.2d 393, 396 (N.J. 1969)).
158. Berg, 137 A.3d at 1151.
159. Id. at 1147.
160. Id. at 1151 (“In this appeal, there is disagreement on the very standard to be applied to whether a contract was formed that triggered a contractual right to ongoing COLAs.”). The supreme court also noted that the court of appeals recognized “that there was a
tension between, on the one hand, the principle of statutory construction that pension statutes are remedial legislation and, on the other, well-recognized case law expressing judicial
hesitancy to find a contract created by a statute.” Id. at 1150.
161. Id. at 1151.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1147–48.
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canons or articulate why the “no contract” canon was better suited
to this situation.
3. Evaluation
State courts in California have haphazardly articulated three
separate canons, including the remedial canon, in addressing Contract Clause challenges to state and local public pension reform.
To the extent that a court remarked on the incongruence among
canons, it did not decide which one should prevail. The chaos
largely stems from the fact that the choice among contradictory
canons has not (yet) been made an issue in the state’s public pension decisions. Complicating the controversy further is that California has different lines of authority arguably espoused by its
highest court.
Given the universal use of the remedial canon across state laws
involving employment, competing canon controversies will be inevitable in the new pension cases contesting reforms under the Contract Clause. Blending the background of the New Jersey (and
most California) remedial canon cases, the most common invocation of this background presumption is where no statutory change
to pension benefits has taken place and, hence, there is no consti164
tutional challenge to their reduction.
A recurring issue with respect to the remedial canon, found in
Alameda and elsewhere, will likely be whether statutory silence
165
amounts to an ambiguity that triggers the canon. The California

164. See discussion supra Section II.A.2. The Supreme Court of Louisiana’s 2016 decision
and analysis in Dunn v. City of Kenner is illustrative. 187 So. 3d 404 (La. 2016). Comparable to
the preliminary interpretation issue in Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n v. Alameda County
Employees’ Retirement Ass’n, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787 (Ct. App. 2018), rev’d on other grounds, 470
P.3d 85 (Cal. 2020), the court determined what types of pay were included in “earnable
compensation” for purposes of calculating firefighters’ pension contributions. Dunn v. City
of Kenner, 187 So.3d at 406. But unlike Alameda County, there had not been a potential
change in the law or any constitutional question raised. Thus, the dispute centered solely on
questions of computation.
165. See supra notes 119–136 and accompanying text. The main issue in Dunn, discussed
supra note 164, was whether the statute was clear or ambiguous for purposes of applying the
remedial canon. 187 So.3d at 410. The state supreme court explained: Pension statutes, like
those at issue in the case, are remedial in nature and “must be liberally construed in favor of
the intended beneficiaries.” Swift v. State, 342 So. 2d 191, 196 (La. 1977). Any ambiguity in
such statutes must be resolved in favor of the persons intended to be benefited by those
statutes. Id. Because the statute was silent on the types of pay at issue, the court of appeals
concluded that it was ambiguous. Dunn, 187 So.3d at 407. While still affirming the result, the
Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 411. Despite the disagreement over the statute’s
clarity, the state supreme court held that the appellate court reached the correct result in
that the various types of pay must be included as earnable compensation. Id. at 416. It held
that the statute was clear that the city must pay pension contributions on all of the kinds of
compensation. Id. at 411 n.6. In deciding the statute was clear notwithstanding the lack of
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Court of Appeals began with the language of the pension legisla166
tion and construed it in a manner to effectuate legislative intent.
Additionally, the court followed the rules of statutory construction
codified by the legislature that list intent as the primary goal of
statutory construction and text as the best evidence to ascertain in167
tent. So even in the face of an ambiguous statute where the remedial canon is potentially applicable, the canon is secondary to
statutory purpose(s). This idea comports with Professor Watson’s
findings that the remedial canon is keyed to the goals of the legislation (and generally subordinated to other more specific interpre168
tative principles). Therefore, the remedial canon reliably reflects
legislative intent. The legislative purpose is overriding, and the remedial canon and its concomitant rule of liberal construction is
not permitted to eradicate legislative judgment.
B. “No Contract” Canon (Unmistakability Doctrine)
The “no contract” canon of construction (otherwise known as
the unmistakability doctrine) is a special rule of government contracting that conserves the legislature’s sovereign authority unless a
yielding of such authority unmistakably appears. 169 It is axiomatic
that exercises of sovereign authority include the power to regu170
late.
In typical Contract Clause cases, the state or local legislature (or
government-controlled entity) has made a promise and a subsequent government action has abrogated that commitment. In the
employment law of government pensions, the original promise
enumerates a certain kind and amount of pension or related benefits. The source of the promise (and its repudiation) is found in
an express textual statement, the state supreme court relied in part on its own precedent in
an analogous case. Id. at 410 (reviewing Fishbein v. State ex rel. L.S.U. Health Scis. Ctr., 898
So. 2d 1260, 1264 (La. 2005)).
166. See supra note 123 and accompanying text; Dunn, 187 So. 3d at 409–10 (“Legislation
is the solemn expression of the legislative will; thus, the interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative intent. . . . The starting point for interpretation of any
statute is the language of the statute itself.” (citing other Louisiana Supreme Court cases));
LA. STAT. ANN. § 24:177(B)(1) (2006) (“The text of a law is the best evidence of legislative
intent.”).
167. See discussion supra Section II.A.1–2.
168. See discussion supra Section II.A.1. In a public pension reform case resolved under
the state Pension Clause, the plaintiffs appeared to have argued the remedial canon at the
trial level, but it was apparently not made an issue on appeal. Eddington v. Dallas Police &
Fire Pension Sys., 508 S.W.3d 774, 779 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, 589 S.W.3d 799 (Tex.
2019).
169. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 924 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
170. Id.
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constitutions, statutes, and ordinances. The application of the
“no contract” canon makes it less likely that government employees
will prove a prior contract for a set amount or kind of pension
benefits.
The following examination provides an overview of the “no contract” canon (unmistakability doctrine) along with its application
172
and evaluation in public pension reform litigation.
1. Overview
The so-called unmistakability doctrine, or “no contract” canon,
represents a tension between two fundamental constitutional ide173
as. The original position amounts to an age-old theory of sovereignty that one legislature may not bind the next, both being
equally supreme. This notion of absolute authority was promoted
174
by Blackstone in his explanation of the English Parliament. The
opposing position specifies that legislative powers may be limited.
This philosophy stems from the American experience with colonial
charters and, subsequently, the adoption of the U.S. Constitution
175
and state constitutions. In federal law, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Contract Clause jurisprudence shows that the latter idea has taken
root in restrictions placed on state power.
The Court has attributed the modern unmistakability principle
to an opinion issued by Chief Justice Marshall during the Found176
ing Era. The doctrine was refined in later cases that applied the

171. Anenson et al., supra note 6, at 21 (also explaining that collective bargaining
agreements can constitute contracts).
172. The forthcoming review of the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of the “no contract” canon and its implications for contractual constraints on legislative freedom of action is not a
complete history. It is meant to provide a suitable background to understand the modern
public pension reform litigation analyzed in the next section.
173. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 872–73 (plurality opinion).
174. See id. at 872 (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
90 (1765)); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 145 (1961) (recognizing that Parliament is
“sovereign, in the sense that it is free, at every moment of its existence as a continuing body,
not only from legal limitations imposed ab extra, but also from its own prior legislation”).
175. See Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 872–73.
176. Id. at 873–74 (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (holding
that the Contract Clause barred Georgia’s effort to rescind land grants made by a prior state
legislature: “[t]he past cannot be recalled by the most absolute power”). The Court had previously pronounced that the unmistakability doctrine originated in the twentieth century. See
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982) (citing City of St. Louis v. United
Rys. Co., 210 U.S. 266 (1908)); Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 875 n.21 (plurality opinion) (citing
Vicksburg S. & P. R. Co. v. Dennis, 116 U.S. 665 (1886); Memphis Gas Light Co. v. Taxing
Dist. of Shelby Cnty., 109 U.S. 398 (1883); Piqua Branch of State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57
U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1854)) (tracking the twentieth century decisions back to an earlier era
and citing so-called “classic Contract Clause unmistakability cases”).
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clause to state contracts in the early nineteenth century. The application of the clause to state contracts over time produced a canon of construction that disfavored “implied government obliga178
tions in public contracts.” State cases appeared around the same
179
time and mirrored the federal principle. In People ex rel. Cunningham v. Roper, for example, the Court of Appeals of New York
articulated that there must be “clear and irresistible evidence that
the engagement was in the nature of a private contract, as distin180
guished from a mere act of general legislation.” The interpretative stance was strict construction and seemingly allowed only for
181
express, and not implied, obligations. After all, the Supreme
Court pronounced that “nothing can be taken against the State by
presumption or inference,” and that overcoming the default rule
182
had to be in “terms too plain to be mistaken.”
At least by the end of the Great Depression, however, circumstances counted as well to identify meaning. 183 Although, the Court
indicated that the text of the legislation remains first and fore184
185
most. In Dodge v. Board of Education, the only public pension
case considered by the Supreme Court, such circumstances includ186
ed the environment of the statute’s adoption. Still, as is typical of

177. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 874 (citing Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514
(1830); Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 420 (1837)).
178. Id.
179. Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1152–53 (N.J. 2016) (calling it a long-held presumption citing state and federal cases dating to the nineteenth century) (citing Shiner v.
Jacobs, 17 N.W. 613, 613 (Iowa 1883); People ex rel. Cunningham v. Roper, 35 N.Y. 629, 633
(1866)).
180. Roper, 35 N.Y. at 633; see also E. Saginaw Mfg. Co. v. City of E. Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259,
274 (1869) (declaring that nothing in the statutory language shows that it is meant to be
perpetual and that “it is neither necessary nor usual to reserve the right of repeal in order
that the Legislature may possess full power to do so”); Washington Univ. v. Rowse, 42 Mo.
308, 323 (1868) (“Every presumption will be made against its surrender, as the power was
committed by the people to the government to be exercised, and not to be alienated.”);
Mott v. Penn. R.R. Co., 30 Pa. 9, 9 (1858).
181. See, e.g., Del. R.R. Tax, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 206, 225 (1873).
182. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 875 (emphasis added) (quoting Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436, 446, (1862)).
183. Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937).
184. In Dodge, for instance, the Court declared it was of “first importance” to examine
the language of the statute. Id. at 78.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 79.
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a strong default rule, neither the text nor the circumstances were
188
enough to overcome the presumption against a contract.
Forty years later, the Supreme Court clarified that relevant circumstances include the statute’s “apparent purpose, context, legis189
lative history, or any other pertinent evidence of actual intent.”
As a result, while the Contract Clause has waxed and waned in im190
portance throughout history, the Court has held firmly to the
191
“no contract” presumption. For example, in Bowen v. Public Agen192
cies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, decided in the late twentieth century, the Supreme Court described the unmistakability
doctrine consistently with past pronouncements: “[S]overeign
power . . . governs all contracts subject to the sovereign’s jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable
193
terms.” In fact, in its plurality decision in United States v. Winstar
194
Corp., commonly invoked in state pension cases applying the “no
contract” canon, the Supreme Court underscored the canon’s phi195
losophy and corrected its historic pedigree. The espoused purposes of the doctrine have been repeated in a few of the new pub196
lic pension decisions. They are to curtail contractual incursions
on state sovereignty and, correspondingly, to avoid constitutional
197
questions that would limit subsequent legislative power. Consequently, the Court developed the canon’s theoretical foundation,
tied the canon to tradition, and set forth its policies. Yet the justic-

187. See Tommy Tobin, Far From a “Dead Letter”: The Contract Clause and North Carolina
Association of Educators v. State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1681 (2018) (commenting that “only one
time in the thirty-seven years from 1940 until 1977 did the U.S. Supreme Court find state
action unconstitutional as violating the Contract Clause”) (citing Janet Irene Levine, The
Contract Clause: A Constitutional Basis for Invalidating State Legislation, 12 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 927,
938 n.75 (1979)).
188. Dodge, 302 U.S at 78–79.
189. U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1977).
190. See generally ELY, supra note 9 (portraying the history of the Contract Clause from its
origins to the present day).
191. But see David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 473, 485–86 (1999) (claiming that what came to be known as the “unmistakability” doctrine was born in 1837 with Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837)—”a doctrine that stood more or less unchallenged for 150 years
until it was gutted by the Supreme Court in Winstar”).
192. Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
193. Id. at 52 (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982)).
194. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996). Notably, Winstar is not a Contract Clause case. While the Supreme Court relied heavily on Contract Clause jurisprudence,
the issue concerned whether the federal government violated its contractual obligation.
195. See id. at 872–75.
196. Id. at 875; see also discussion infra Section II.B.2.b.
197. Id.; see also Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932) (“[T]he will of a particular Congress . . . does not impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding years”); Hugo
Black, Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 191 (1972) (characterizing this “most familiar and fundamental principl[e]” as “so obvious as rarely to be
stated”).
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198
es in Winstar disagreed about almost everything else. The case
spawned a cottage industry of scholarly commentary about when to
apply the “no contract” canon, its implications, and the relationship of the canon to other government contract doctrines that are
199
not relevant to this analysis.
The Supreme Court’s 2018 Contract Clause decision in Sveen v.
200
Melin was an opportunity to unify its position on the clear statement rule against contracts. 201 Nevertheless, the existence of a contract was not at issue in that case and the “no contract” canon re202
mains a conceptual conundrum. Accordingly, one might expect
Supreme Court precedent to hardly influence the twenty-first century public pension reform controversies. But that expectation
would be wrong.

2. Application
This section provides a comprehensive accounting of the “no
contract” canon’s application to constitutional controversies over
state and local pension reform. There are nineteen such cases
203
across fourteen states. The following discussion describes the
canon, identifies its sources and justifications, and analyzes what
198. See James A. Bloom, Plurality and Precedence: Judicial Reasoning, Lower Courts, and the
Meaning of United States v. Winstar Corp., 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (2008) (commenting that the Winstar concurrence and dissent “agreed” that the unmistakability doctrine
applies to all government contracts, while the plurality argued that the unmistakability doctrine applies only when the government’s sovereign power is implicated).
199. See, e.g., Alan R. Burch, Purchasing the Right to Govern: Winstar and the Need to Reconceptualize the Law of Regulatory Agreements, 88 KY. L.J. 245 (2000) (exploring the relationship
between the express delegation doctrine, the reserved powers, and the unmistakability doctrine); Joshua I. Schwartz, Liability For Sovereign Acts: Congruence and Exceptionalism in Government Contracts Law, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 633 (1996) (“The scope and rationale of
each of these two doctrines, the sovereign acts doctrine and the unmistakability doctrine,
have been far from clear.”); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Excuse Doctrine and Retrospective Legislation: The Winstar Case, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 795 (outlining implications of Winstar).
200. Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815 (2018).
201. See id. (involving statutory default rule retroactively revoking insurance policy beneficiary to policies bought before the statutes adoption); Joshua I. Schwartz, The Status of the
Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability Doctrines in the Wake of Winstar: An Interim Report, 51 ALA. L.
REV. 1177 (2000) (analyzing post-Winstar decisional law and its impact on the unmistakability doctrine).
202. See Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1821. The Court’s attention was directed to whether the retroactive statute constituted a “substantial” impairment of the contract. See id. at 1821–26
(declaring that the legislation did not substantially impair the insurance contract). For an
article describing the Court’s Contract Clause jurisprudence as essentially incoherent, see
James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the Federal Contract Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against the State, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 437–45 (1982).
203. The cases are from the following states: Alabama, California, Colorado, Oregon,
Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. See infra Appendix. The Illinois decision was pursuant to
the state Pension Clause and not the Contract Clause. See infra Appendix.
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evidence is required to rebut the presumption that there is no contract.
a. Sources
Nearly all of the recent public pension reform decisions raising
the “no contract” canon cite cases from the Supreme Court of the
204
United States in addition to state precedent. Reference to the
Supreme Court is not surprising given that an overwhelming number of the public pension reform cases claimed violations of both
205
the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions. Though even
courts that ruled solely on state constitutional Contract Clause
206
challenges, such as Fry v. City of Los Angeles, Cal Fire Local 2881 v.
207
Cal. Public Employees’ Retirement System, and a trio of trial court cases from Rhode Island, depended on Supreme Court opinions. 208
The reason likely goes beyond intellectual authority. These states,
like most, have judicial opinions declaring that federal and state
209
law concerning the Contract Clause are the same. Thus, setting
aside the Supreme Court’s repeated declarations that it will defer
to state law on the issue of a contract (although affirming that fed-

204. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.a. The one exception is Moro v. State, 351 P.3d 1
(Ore. 2015), but the majority still relied on federal cases to define the Contract Clause analysis as applying only to retrospective laws and for the latter parts of the constitutional test. Id.
at 18, 38.
205. See, e.g., Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1151 (N.J. 2016); Moro, 351 P.3d at 18; Pro.
Fire Fighters of N.H., 107 A.3d 1229, 1230 (N.H. 2014). Some cases were in federal court.
See, e.g., Me. Ass’n of Retirees v. Bd. of Trs. of the Me. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 758 F.3d 23, 29
(1st Cir. 2014); Taylor v. City of Gladsden, 767 F.3d 1124, 1133–34 (11th Cir. 2014). For cases challenged under the federal constitution only, see Cranston Firefighters v. Raimondo, 880
F.3d 44, 47 (1st Cir. 2018), which assessed changes to a Rhode Island pension scheme. In
Maine Ass’n of Retirees, it is unclear whether the contested reforms were grounded in only
federal law as articulated in the opinion or both federal and state law as indicated in the
Westlaw headnotes. 758 F.3d at 25.
206. Fry v. City of Los Angeles, 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694, 700 (Ct. App. 2016).
207. Cal Fire Local 2881 v. Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 435 P.3d 433 (Cal. 2019).
208. For California, see Cal Fire, 435 P.3d at 441–42; Fry, 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 700, 702.
For Rhode Island, see Rhode Island Public Employees’ Retiree Coal. v. Chafee, No. PC123166,
2014 WL 1577496 at *3 (R.I. Super. Apr. 16, 2014); Rhode Island Council 94 v. Chafee, No. PC
12-3168, 2014 WL 1743149 at *6 (R.I. Super. Apr. 25, 2014); and Bristol/Warren Regional
School Employees v. Chafee, Nos. PC 12-3167, PC 12-3169, PC 12-3579, 2014 WL 1743142 at *7
(R.I. Super. Apr. 25, 2014).
209. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 9, at 251 (“More than twenty states have treated the state
contract clauses as equivalent to the federal provision.”); Taylor v. City of Gladsden, 767
F.3d 1124, 1130–31 (11th Cir. 2014) (federal and Alabama law); Pro. Fire Fighters of N.H., 107
A.3d at 1236; Berg, 137 A.3d at 1150–51; see also Moro, 351 P.3d at 18 (explaining that the
state constitutional provision was adopted in 1857 and derived from the federal Contract
Clause such that the state contract clause is interpreted in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the federal contract clause in 1857).
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eral law ultimately answers the question), the discussion below
reveals how the opposite is happening.
The U.S. Supreme Court opinions cited most often are United
211
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey followed by National Railroad Passenger
212
Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., then United States v.
213
214
Winstar Corp. and Dodge v. Board of Education. As indicated previously in Section II.B.1, Dodge is the sole public pension case in the
Court’s Contract Clause jurisprudence. Other references were to
215
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand.
Most of the state and federal courts facing constitutional Contract Clause challenges to public pension reform relied on these
216
decisions to describe the clear statement canon and its policies.
They looked to Supreme Court authority for the invocation of the
substantive canon, its strength as a clear statement rule, and an ac217
counting of its underlying philosophy. Only a few courts cited
federal opinions for their factual settings, including what conditions would (or would not) overcome the presumption against
218
contract. If they did undertake a factual comparison, the analogous decision offered was usually National Railroad Passenger
219
220
221
Corp., Brand., or United States Trust Co. of New York.

210. See, e.g., Anenson et al., supra note 6, at 17 n.77; infra note 318. The first case to
articulate that federal courts would make an independent judgment about the existence of a
contract was Ohio Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Deolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416, 433 (1854). See
Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly 68 U.S. 436, 443 (1862) (indicating rationale for federal law
was to prevent a state from escaping the Contract Clause).
211. U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1977); see, e.g., Cal Fire, 435 P.3d
442–43.
212. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451,
466 (1985); see, e.g., Puckett v. Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590, 600 (6th
Cir. 2016); Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, 151 F. Supp. 3d 830, 835–36 (E.D. Tenn. 2015);
Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 209 (Colo. 2014); Lake v. State Health Plan for Tchrs. & State
Emps., 825 S.E.2d 645, 650 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019).
213. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 860 (1996) (plurality opinion); see,
e.g., Puckett, 833 F.3d at 600; Pro. Fire Fighters of N.H., 107 A.3d at 1236.
214. Dodge v. Bd. Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1937). Winstar and Dodge tie for second place. See,
e.g., Frazier, 151 F. Supp. 3d at 835; Justus, 336 P.3d at 214; Berg, 137 A.3d at 1152; Lake, 825
S.E.2d at 650; cf. Cal Fire, 435 P.3d at 446 (citing Dodge as an illustration of the former gratuity approach to pensions and not for the unmistakability doctrine standard).
215. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938); see, e.g., Cranston Firefighters
v. Raimondo, 880 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir. 2018) (distinguishing statutory language from contractual language in Brand.); Justus, 336 P.3d at 213 (Coats, J., concurring).
216. See, e.g., Jones v. Mun. Emps.’ Annuity & Benefit Fund., 50 N.E.3d 596, 605–06 (Ill.
2016) (using National Railroad Passenger Corp. for the rationale, effect, and strength of the
presumption against contract).
217. See Am. Fed’n of Tchrs.—N.H. v. State, 111 A.3d 63, 69 (N.H. 2015) (relying on National Railroad Passenger Corp. for the order of the evidence in that the court should begin
with the text of the statute); supra Section II.B.1.
218. See, e.g., Cranston Firefighters, 880 F.3d at 49; Justus, 336 P.3d at 212.
219. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451
(1985).
220. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
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For example, in National Railroad Passenger Corp., private railroads sued the federal government for changing their reimburse222
ment scheme with Amtrak. The statute that allegedly constituted
an unchangeable contract was enacted in an atmosphere of perva223
sive prior regulation. According to the Supreme Court, these circumstances suggested that the railroads had no legitimate expecta224
The Court was also
tion that the regulation would cease.
persuaded against a finding of contract because the same statute
225
had an express reservation of the power to repeal. In contrast,
sometimes courts facing pension challenges distinguish U.S. Supreme Court cases finding government contracts on the basis of
226
express contractual language. United States Trust Co. of New York
clearly conveyed a contract by the parties promising to “covenant
227
and agree” in the statute. Similarly, in Brand, the legislature used
the very term “contract” twenty-five times in the statute. 228
The new pension cases, however, did not rely on federal decisions alone. Indeed, perhaps due to the lack of any public pension
229
cases from the Supreme Court docket for more than eighty years,
courts faced with Contract Clause challenges instead cite to decisions from other states. In applying the “no contract” canon, judges generally followed the results reached on equivalent reforms in
230
those outside jurisdictions. A few courts additionally relied on
221. U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1977).
222. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 453.
223. Id. at 469.
224. Id.
225. See id.; accord Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S.
41, 52–54 (1986) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.) (declaring that the “effect of these few
simple words” has been settled since the Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 700, 25 L. Ed.
496 (1879)). Alternatively, the Court held that any purported contract right could be
changed and was not unconstitutional. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. 470 U.S. 475–78. Because
contracts are property, challenges against the federal government fall under the Takings or
Due Process Clauses. The latter allows contract changes that have a rational basis. See ELY,
supra note 9, at 234–35.
226. See Cranston Firefighters v. Raimondo, 880 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2018) (distinguishing U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) and Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S.
95 (1938)).
227. Id. at 18.
228. Id. at 105 (counting the word in both the body and title of the statute). “Contract”
was referenced in a prior statute as well. Id. The Court declared the statute was “couched in
contract.” Id.
229. See ELY, supra note 9, at 249 (noting the Supreme Court’s “marked neglect” of the
Contract Clause in general).
230. For instance, faced with the issue of whether cost-of-living allowances (COLAs) were
part of the pension contract set forth in prior legislation, the Supreme Courts of Colorado,
New Hampshire, and New Jersey relied on the result in out-of-state cases that held they were
not. See Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 208–09 (Colo. 2014) (citing Me. Ass’n of Retirees v. Bd.
of Trs. of the Me. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 758 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 2014)); Berg v. Christie, 137
A.3d 1143, 1153 (N.J. 2016) (citing Me. Ass’n of Retirees and ruling that retirees’ Contract
Clause argument concerning COLA changes failed)); Am. Fed’n of Tchrs.—N.H. v. State,
111 A.3d 63, 73 (N.H. 2015) (citing Me. Ass’n of Retirees, 758 F.3d at 31; Scott v. Williams, 107

FALL 2020]

Clashing Canons

179

their own precedent in determining when the clear statement rule
231
is overcome—or at least were not willing to overrule it.
b. Rationales
The new pension cases are uniform in their basis for invoking
the “no contract” clear statement rule. The primary reason given
for the presumption is that the principal function of the legislature
232
is to make policy and not contracts. Of course, legislatures do
both. But when the form of the purported agreement is a statute
rather than a contract, it is likely that the political branch was operating in its government (sovereign) rather than its proprietary
capacity. The search for meaning is tied to the presumed intent of
the parties to the alleged agreement. As such, the presumption
against contract serves the value of popular will because it reflects
233
the choices made by the people who created the law. This value
is grounded not only in statutory interpretation but also in con234
tract law. In particular, similar to the unmistakability doctrine for
legislative enactments, the law of contracts includes default rules
that fill gaps when the parties have been silent or when the mean235
ing of their words is unclear. Thus, the resistance norms are
So.3d 379, 388–89 (Fla. 2013)); Pro. Fire Fighters of N.H. v. State, 107 A.3d 1229, 1235–36
(N.H. 2014) (citing In re Enrolled Senate Bill 1269, 209 N.W.2d 200, 201–02 (Mich. 1973)
and Scott v. Williams, 107 So.3d 379, 389 (Fla. 2013)); Bartlett v. Cameron, 316 P.3d 889,
895 (N.M. 2013); Wash. Educ. Ass’n. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 332 P.3d 439, 444–48
(Wash. 2014); accord Puckett v. Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590, 603 (6th
Cir. 2016) (finding no contract that would make a COLA unchangeable in Kentucky and
citing cases from Maine, Colorado, New Hampshire, and New Mexico). Although certain
judges did discount the equivalency of reforms by recognizing potential distinctions in the
language and circumstances of various state pension legislation. See Puckett, 833 F.3d at 611–
12 (Stranch, J., concurring) (cautioning against reliance on decisions based on other state
laws because of the potentially different language and circumstances). The Supreme Court
of Arizona also reached a similar conclusion of contract (or lack of contract) by adopting
the same meaning of a common word in the legislation. See Hon. Fields v. Elected Offs.’ Ret.
Plan, 320 P.3d 1160, 1166 (Ariz. 2014) (comparing and contrasting definition of “benefit” in
other states for the purposes of interpreting a state constitutional pension clause).
231. Cal Fire Local 2881 v. Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 435 P.3d 433, 433, 446–48 (Cal.
2019); Moro v. State, 351 P.3d 1, 19–20, 24 (Ore. 2015); cf. Anenson et al., supra note 6, at
24–25 (discussing case law in Colorado in which the state supreme court distinguished, and
to some extent overruled, its precedent to reach the conclusion that legislation tightening
public pension benefits was valid).
232. See, e.g., Puckett, 833 F.3d at 611–12 (reviewing changes to Kentucky’s public pension system); Cranston Firefighters v. Raimondo, 880 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir. 2018) (assessing
changes to Rhode Island pension scheme); Lake v. State Health Plan for Tchrs. & State
Emps., 825 S.E.2d 645, 650 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019).
233. HUHN, supra 30, at 16.
234. Id. (explaining that intent supports popular sovereignty for public enacted law and
personal autonomy for the private law of contract).
235. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 453. The use of implied terms is a familiar part of contract
law without which contracts would not be susceptible to construction. Id. Courts addressing
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meant to follow the parties’ expectations—whether private or public.
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in United States v. Winstar
236
Corp., one of the last Supreme Court cases to address the “no
contract” canon, illustrates this point. As mentioned previously in
Section II.B.1, the case is notable for its multiple opinions disputing when the unmistakability doctrine applies and what evidence is
required to rebut it. Of the Winstar references, Justice Scalia’s
opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, is routinely cited
in state and federal Contract Clause (including public pension)
237
cases. Justice Scalia grounded the doctrine in the private law of
238
contractual intent. He explained that there is a rule of presumed
(or implied-in-fact) intent that a contracting party will not render
239
performance impossible. When the contracting party is the gov240
ernment, on the other hand, there is a “reverse presumption.”
Scalia emphasized: “Governments do not ordinarily agree to curtail
their sovereign or legislative powers, and contracts must be interpreted in a commonsense way against that background under241
standing.” Consequently, the resistance rule to the release of legislative power answers an empirical question.
All the same, the underlying philosophy of this canon of construction (as espoused by the courts) hints at a normative foundation as well. As a corollary to the functional account of legislative
action, courts routinely declare the canon justified because one
242
legislature generally does not bind another. To do so would be to
243
“surrender a fundamental prerogative of legislative power.” The
risk is that the primary lawmaker in a democracy will give up the
duty to enact laws by legislative vote. Whereas most courts simply
244
allude to the “harsh ramifications” of a statutory contract, others
spell out the obvious repercussions for our representative form of

constitutional contract issues that do not use the unmistakability doctrine use private law
contract canons. See, e.g., Borders v. Atlanta, 779 S.E.2d 279, 285 (Ga. 2015).
236. 518 U.S. 839 (1996). For an earlier discussion of Winstar, see supra notes 194–199.
237. See, e.g., S. States Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. Bentley, 219 So.3d 634, 645 (Ala.
2016).
238. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 920 (characterizing the “no contract” canon as stemming
from “normal principles of contract interpretation”).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 921 (“The requirement of unmistakability embodies this reversal of the normal reasonable presumption.”).
241. Id. He found it “reasonable to presume (unless the opposite clearly appears) that the
sovereign does not promise that none of its multifarious sovereign acts, needful for the public good, will incidentally disable it or the other party from performing one of the promised
acts.” Id. (emphasis in original).
242. See, e.g., Moro v. State, 351 P.3d 1, 36 (Ore. 2015).
243. Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1152 (N.J. 2016).
244. Id.
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245
government. In Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, the Eastern District
of Tennessee explained that to construe laws as contracts when the
obligation is not clearly and unequivocally expressed would be “to
246
limit drastically the essential powers of a legislative body.” It further declared that “the continued existence of a government
would be of no great value, if by implications and presumptions, it
was disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its
247
creation.”
Because the effect of finding a public pension contract would be
248
to reduce legislative power, the “no contract” canon protects the
sovereign powers of state and local governments. The idea is that
legislation should not be read loosely to reduce long settled powers
249
within the lawmaking branch of government. Therefore, the judicial preference against changing the traditional powers of the
legislative branch without a clear statement (express or implied)
250
supports institutional stability and, by extension, allocation of re251
sponsibility between courts and politically accountable bodies.
Put simply, the “no contract” presumption is an illustration of statutory interpretation grounded in the separation of powers doc252
trine. The textual technique for implementing that value works
as part of a broader meta-rule of non-interference with the cus253
tomary divisions of power in the government. The constitutionally-derived doctrine of separation of powers makes government
more efficient through an effective division of labor and disperses
254
power to reduce the risk of tyranny. The unmistakability axiom
can be envisioned as advancing both goals. Due to this customary

245. 151 F. Supp. 3d 830 (E.D. Tenn. 2015).
246. Id. at 836 (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 470 U.S. 451, 466 (1985)).
247. Id. For a much earlier elaboration on the implications of potential constraints on
future legislative lawmaking, see East Saginaw Manufacturing Co. v. City of East Saginaw, 19
Mich. 259, 274 (1869).
248. Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 207 (Colo. 2014); Jones v. Mun. Emps.’ Annuity &
Benefit Fund, 50 N.E.3d 596, 606 (Ill. 2016).
249. See Tyler, supra note 35, at 1426–27 (maintaining that legislation should not be read
loosely to impact long settled divisions of power among the branches).
250. Id. at 1428; see also Sunstein, supra note 2, at 458 (arguing that it provides a check
on the factional power or self-interested behavior of bureaucrats).
251. See Stephenson, supra note 35, at 38–39 (describing standard argument supporting
substantive canons on grounds of advancing judicial modesty and inter-branch relations);
discussion infra Part III.
252. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 37, at 605.
253. See Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1023 (describing metarule to preserve the traditional
separation of responsibilities in government).
254. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 432–33
(1987). For a discussion of the competing purposes of the separation of powers doctrines,
see W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 127–28 (1965); and Paul R.
Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 301, 303–04 (1989).
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arrangement, courts move cautiously when legislative indicators
255
are vague.
In addition to the institutional emphasis on separation of powers, a few courts assessing public pension reform have picked up a
related reason for the default rule from the Winstar plurality: to
256
avoid difficult constitutional questions. Somewhat surprisingly
given state budget troubles, no court facing pension contests has
yet adopted the rationale set forth in the dissenting opinion in
257
Winstar—to protect the public fisc.
Another procedural value not found in the U.S. Supreme Court
cases, but advanced by at least one state supreme court, determines
258
that the “no contract” canon enables the government to act. The
Supreme Court of Washington in Washington Education Ass’n v. De259
partment of Retirement Systems additionally couched this prerogative
as for the good of the employee. The court declared: “Surely the
legislature can make the addition of [a COLA] subject to its right
to amend or repeal the program in the future. To say otherwise
would strongly disincentivize the legislature from providing addi260
tional benefits beyond a basic pension.”
c. Description
Given the reliance on a common core of federal cases, all of the
courts described the “no contract” canon in similar terms. Indeed,
they universally required that any purported contract and its terms
261
be “clear.” A majority of them also added “unmistakable” to the
262
description. For example, the Oregon Supreme Court in Moro v.
255. See Tyler, supra note 35, at 1421, 1426 (discussing judicial role in construing statutes
as guardians of coherence and not prevailing political winds or social norms).
256. See Puckett v. Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590, 600 (6th Cir.
2016); Cranston Firefighters v. Raimondo, 880 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir. 2018) (assessing changes
to Rhode Island pension scheme).
257. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 937 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The wisdom of this principle arises, not from any ancient privileges of the sovereign,
but from the necessity of protecting the federal fisc—and the taxpayers who foot the bills—
from possible improvidence on the part of the countless Government officials who must be
authorized to enter into contracts for the Government.”). The reason is similar to the rationale for government immunities from civil actions. The financial savings goal is often
weighed in the latter part of the Contract Clause analysis.
258. See Wash. Educ. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 332 P.3d 439, 446 (Wash. 2014); discussion infra Part III.
259. 332 P.3d at 446.
260. See id.
261. See, e.g., Moro v. State, 351 P.3d 1, 24 (Ore. 2015); Fry v. City of Los Angeles, 199
Cal. Rptr. 3d 694, 702 (Ct. App. 2016).
262. See, e.g., Taylor v. City of Gladsden, 767 F.3d 1124, 1133–34 (11th Cir. 2014) (ruling
that unless there is unmistakable intent, we presume no contract); Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d
1143, 1154 (N.J. 2016); Petit-Clair v. City of Perth Amboy, No. A-2049-14T2, 2018 WL
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263

State mandated that the contract and its terms be both “clear and
unmistakable.” 264 When setting forth the so-called “unmistakability
265
doctrine,” the First Circuit Court of Appeals similarly required a
266
“clear and unequivocal” legislative intent to contract. The Cali267
fornia Court of Appeals in Fry v. City of Los Angeles correspondingly held that only a “clear and unambiguous” intent to enter an unchangeable contract would suffice. 268 The Supreme Court of
California endorsed this view in Cal Fire Local 2881 v. California Pub269
lic Employees’ Retirement System, although it circumvented the canon by allowing pension benefit terms to be contractual on an alternative ground pursuant to its prior precedent. 270
A few courts elaborated that the plaintiff carries a “heavy bur271
den,” emphasizing the “high bar” to overcome the presump272
tion. Further, they explain that a judge will “proceed cautiously”
273
to identify a contract and its terms, with “all doubts resolved in
274
favor” of a finding that there is no contract. The First Circuit

4262959 at *6, 9 (N.J. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2018) (extending its high court decision applying the
unmistakability standard for legislative intent to a municipal body).
263. 351 P.3d 1 (Ore. 2015).
264. Id. at 24.
265. Me. Ass’n of Retirees v. Bd. of Trs. of the Me. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 758 F.3d 23, 2930 (1st Cir. 2014); Prof’l Fire Fighters of N.H. v. State, 107 A.3d 1229, 1234 (N.H. 2014).
266. Me. Ass’n of Retirees, 758 F.3d at 30; Cranston Firefighters v. Raimondo, 880 F.3d 44,
48 (1st Cir. 2018); see Jones v. Mun. Emps.’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, 50 N.E.3d 596, 605–06
(Ill. 2016) (clearly and unequivocally expressed intention).
267. 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694 (Ct. App. 2016).
268. Id. at 702.
269. 435 P.3d 433 (Cal. 2019).
270. Id. at 447–48. The court found that pensions provided in the employment context
were automatically contractual. Id. But that the elimination of the provision at issue did not
run afoul of the constitution because it was not tied to work performed. Id. at 448–49.
271. Me. Ass’n of Retirees, 758 F.3d at 29; Prof’l Fire Fighters of N.H. v. State, 107 A.3d
1229, 1233–34 (N.H. 2014); R.I. Pub. Emps.’ Retiree Coal. v. Chafee, No. PC123166, 2014
WL 1577496 at *3 (R.I. Super. Apr. 16, 2014); see also Fry v. City of Los Angeles, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 694, 705 (Ct. App. 2016) (ruling that current and retired police and fire employees
did not carry their “heavy burden” of demonstrating a clear intent in the Delegation Ordinance to create a vested right to a Board-determined health insurance subsidy).
272. Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1152 (N.J. 2016).
273. Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, 151 F. Supp. 3d 830, 836 (E.D. Tenn. 2015); Taylor
v. City of Gladsden, 767 F.3d 1124, 1133–34 (11th Cir. 2014); Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202,
209 (Colo. 2014); Prof’l Fire Fighters of N.H. v. State, 107 A.3d 1229, 1233–34 (N.H. 2014).
While not articulating the canon to decide there was no Contract Clause violation for the
repeal of a COLA, the Supreme Court of Washington in Washington Education Ass’n v. Washington Department of Retirement Systems declared generally that “this court is hesitant to infer
contract rights from a statute.” 332 P.3d 439, 443 (Wash. 2014) (citing pension and nonpension cases).
274. Fry, Cal. Rptr. 3d at 702; see Puckett v. Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 833
F.3d 590, 600 (6th Cir. 2016) (declaring that the statute must be “clear beyond any doubt”)
(citing Winstar); AFT Mich. v. State, 893 N.W.2d 90, 105 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016) (Saad, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (declaring that the law at issue “be susceptible to
no other reasonable construction” except a contract), aff’d, 904 N.W.2d 417, 418 (Mich.
2017).
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Court of Appeals in Cranston Firefighters v. Raimondo aptly summarized the difficulty of surmounting the presumption: “A claim that
a state statute creates a contract that binds future legislatures confronts a tropical-force headwind in the form of the ‘unmistakability
276
doctrine.’ ”
d. Rebuttal Evidence
What constitutes a “clear” intent to contract in order to rebut
the “no contract” presumption is critical and worthy of elaboration. Generally, courts reiterate the text and circumstances ap277
A few courts
proach announced by the U.S. Supreme Court.
have declared a hierarchy of evidence with the language of the leg278
islation being the best, or at least the first, step. Likewise, one
court of appeals questioned whether the circumstances would be
279
enough alone to rebut the presumption.
Other courts repeated the refrain that a pension contract may
be express or implied but seemed to prefer the language of the
legislation. More specifically, given their rationale, holdings, and
factual background, some opinions might be read to mean that on280
ly express contractual text would overcome the presumption.
275. 880 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2018).
276. Id. at 48.
277. See discussion supra Section II.B.1; cf. Police Benevolent Ass’n of New York State,
Inc. v. Cuomo, 343 F. Supp. 3d 39, 64–65 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (declaring presumption that no
benefits or related provisions of a collective bargaining agreement extend beyond the
agreement unless expressly stated or implied from the circumstances); accord CNH Industrial N.V. v. Jack Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761, 767 (2018) (ruling that an expired collective bargaining
agreement did not create right to lifetime retiree health care benefits).
278. See Am. Fed. of Tchrs. v. State, 111 A.3d 63, 69 (N.H. 2015); Me. Ass’n of Retirees v.
Bd. of Trs. of the Me. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 758 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2014) (post-1999 retirees); accord Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 78 (1937) (declaring the text of the statute
was of “first importance”). For example, adopting the “no contract” canon for the first time
in 2014, American Federation of Teachers v. State, 111 A.3d 63, 69 (N.H. 2015) (explaining that
they adopted the unmistakablility doctrine in Professional Fire Fighters of New Hampshire v.
State), the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Professional Fire Fighters of New Hampshire v.
State, declared that the statutory language is the first step to ascertain whether a contract
exists and the scope of the obligation. 107 A.3d 1229, 1235–36 (N.H. 2014) (reversing the
lower court determination that employees had a contract right to a fixed contribution rate).
279. See Cranston Firefighters v. Raimondo, 880 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 2018) (reviewing
Rhode Island law). In Berg v. Christie, the Supreme Court of New Jersey separately analyzed
the different kinds of rebuttal evidence indicating that the court would not evaluate them
cumulatively. 137 A.3d 1143, 1155–62 (N.J. 2016).
280. Two New Hampshire Supreme Court cases illustrate the point. Professional Fire Fighters of New Hampshire v. State held that the government is not constitutionally prohibited from
increasing member contributions to a state retirement system. 107 A.3d at 1235. The Supreme Court then set forth the text of the statute (that did not specify a contract) and simply concluded that there was no unmistakable intent to establish contribution rates as a contractual right that cannot be modified. See id. The next year in American Federation of Teachers
v. State, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reiterated the clear statement standard for as-
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Certain courts have outright declared that magic words like “con281
tract” are required to overcome the presumption, though none
in the current set of constitutional cases has gone this far. With
these rulings, legislative silence would defeat constitutional chal282
lenges to public pension reform. Another court indicated that a
contract would not exist by mere implication other than for a nar283
rowly defined set of circumstances. Relevant circumstances also
have been confined to “the party claiming the contractual right”
rather than extending more broadly to the history of the regula284
tion.
Nevertheless, the majority of courts view the language and circumstances potentially amounting to a contract in a less constricted manner. In reading the text itself, some courts have confirmed
285
that key terms such as “contract” are not required. In Moro v.
286
State, for example, the Supreme Court of Oregon unequivocally
refuted the necessity of the statute listing words like “contract,”
287
“guarantee,” or “promise.” Nonetheless, judges agree that mandatory language like “shall” is insufficient to constitute a con288
tract. Legislation using the word “vest” is usually not enough,
certaining whether provisions in a public pension plan is an unchangeable contract. 111
A.3d 63, 69 (N.H. 2015). State employees claimed that prospective changes to their cost-ofliving allowances (COLAs) and the definition of earnable compensation violated the state
and federal constitutions. Id. at 66. The New Hampshire Constitution prohibits retrospective
laws rather than contractual impairment, but the proscription has been read to duplicate
the federal Contract Clause. See id. at 68–69 (citing N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 23). The court
again emphasized that its analysis begins (and seemingly ends) with the statutory language
itself. Id. at 69.
281. See Budge v. Town of Millinocket, 55 A.3d 484, 490 (Me. 2012) (holding that contractual rights can arise only when the statute “used express language to create contractual
rights.”); Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 517–20 (Me.1993) (Wathen, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s apparent adoption of an “iron-clad requirement” that “the statute expressly state[ ] that it is a contract” as overly simple and blind to relevant factors).
282. See supra notes 280–81. The Supreme Court of Illinois appeared to require such
magic words in Jones v. Municipal Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, albeit to aid employees.
50 N.E.3d 596, 605–06 (Ill. 2016).
283. Moro v. State, 351 P.3d 1, 21 (Ore. 2015). These circumstances happened to include public pension benefits, but the prospective changes were ultimately deemed constitutional because the court found that the obligations that the terms required were changeable. See id. at 36–37.
284. Am. Fed’n of Tchrs., 111 A.3d at 72.
285. See Me. Ass’n of Retirees v. Bd. of Trs. of the Me. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 758 F.3d 23,
29 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that expressly using the language of contract or barring the
future reduction of benefits already granted would prove unmistakable intent) (citing Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 60–61 (1st Cir. 1999)).
286. 351 P.3d 1 (Ore. 2015).
287. Id. at 24 (refusing respondents’ assertion that the legislature can satisfy the clear
statement standard only by expressly describing the statutory benefit as a contract, promise,
or guarantee).
288. Id. at 36 (“The legislature’s use of ‘shall,’ without more, is plainly insufficient to
establish the irrevocability of an offer.”); see Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 211 (Colo. 2014);
Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, 151 F. Supp. 3d 830, 837 (E.D. Tenn. 2015) (“The mere use
of the word “shall” does not suffice to show a clear indication of intent to be bound.”);
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either, to create an implied contractual commitment.
Furthermore, courts have been quick to utilize a plain language
analysis to declare that pension “benefits” are not the same as “ob290
ligations.” Taylor v. City of Gladsden reflects this technique. In that
case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished pension
“benefits” from “obligations” like employee contribution rates that
merely reduce plaintiffs’ compensation by deducting from their fu291
ture take-home pay. Courts have additionally differentiated between “benefits” and “COLAs”—especially if the legislature grant292
ed the latter in a separate statute. How the COLA operates also
matters. Certain courts find that the COLA is less likely to be held
contractual if it has a built-in mechanism for adjustment against
the consumer price index with the base pension benefit as a floor
that is protected against deflationary reduction. For instance, in
Berg v. Christie, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the op-

Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79–81 (1937) (finding “shall” is not enough to support a
finding of contract in case in which public employees alleged a constitutional violation due
to a state statute decreasing pension benefits). In Moro v. State, the mandatory language did
assist the court in determining that COLAs were terms of the pension contract pursuant to
precedent but that the term was not unchangeable. 351 P.3d at 28–29 (citing Strunk v.
PERB, 108 P.3d 1058 (Ore. 2005)).
289. Am. Fed’n. of Tchrs. v. State, 111 A.3d 63, 70–71 (N.H. 2015) (citing Nat’l Educ.
Ass’n–R.I. v. Ret. Bd., 172 F.3d 22, 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1999)). In particular, the court announced that there was no language (unmistakable or otherwise) indicating that once a
member vests, a contract is created whereby none of the terms of the future benefit may be
modified prospectively. Id. at 71; accord Van Houten v. City of Fort Worth, 827 F.3d 530, 535
(5th Cir. 2016) (reaching same result under the Pension Clause of the Texas Constitution).
But see Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps. v. Chafee, Nos. PC 12-3167, PC 12-3169, PC 12-3579,
2014 WL 1743142 at *9 (R.I. Super. Apr. 25, 2014) (adopting vesting under the pension
statutory criteria as when the contract is formed). Courts and commentators have created
confusion by using the term “vest” to mean different things. Anenson et al., supra note 6, at
17 n.73 (explaining how courts do not always distinguish between satisfaction of service and
retirement eligibility).
290. 767 F.3d 1124, 1133–34 (11th Cir. 2014).
291. Id. at 1135 (construing Alabama law).
292. Puckett v. Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590, 602–03 (6th Cir.
2016) (reviewing Kentucky legislation) (distinguishing benefits from COLAs based on statutory language); Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1155 (N.J. 2016). Contra R.I. Pub. Emps.’
Retiree Coal. v. Chafee, No. PC123166, 2014 WL 1577496 at *4 (R.I. Super. Apr. 16, 2014)
(“Upon retirement, under Rhode Island law, COLAs and pension benefits are one and the
same, providing retirees with a vested interest in the benefits which may not be altered retroactively.”). For example, in American Federation of Teachers v. State, the New Hampshire Supreme Court declared: “Nowhere does the statutory language state that a retirement allowance includes COLAs.” 111 A.3d 63, 73 (N.H. 2015). Not all judges, however, agree on the
significance of a separate statute. The dissent in Berg v. Christie, approving the decision of
the intermediate appellate court, claimed that the statute made a clear contractual promise
sufficient to overcome the presumption. 137 A.3d 1143, 1163–64 (N.J. 2016) (Albin, J., dissenting). The issue was whether COLAs were part of the promise made in a 1997 statute that
employees had a non-forfeitable right to receive pension benefits “under the laws governing
the retirement system” and that their “benefits program” could not be reduced. Id. at 1163.
The dissent found it obvious that COLAs, provided for in another statute, were part of these
“laws.” Id. at 1163–64. It also asserted that the “program” included base benefits, medical
benefits (that were explicitly excluded), and COLAs. Id.; see also id. at 1157–58.
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eration of the COLAs in relation to base pension benefits demon293
strated that they were distinct and not one and the same. Moreo294
ver, identical to Supreme Court precedent, if the statute or other
legislation contains a clause that expressly reserves the right to
amend it, then the “no contract” presumption appears irrebutta295
ble. Another common resource for rebuttal of the presumption
is the comparison of words in the statute at issue with other pen296
sion-related statutes.
In circumstances where judges may find the presumption overcome, the types of evidence considered usually amount to the
297
standard proof of legislative intent. In particular, courts fre298
quently examine prior versions of the text. The previous laws
were assessed not only for what they said in relation to the present
enactment, but also for the existence of different pension provisions in the former law or laws. Indeed, the number of changes

293. Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1161 (N.J. 2016) (citing Me. Ass’n of Retirees v. Bd.
of Trs. of the Me. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 758 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 2014)) (accepting as “possible” the argument that “in setting the retirement-date pension amount as the floor below
which a negative CPI [consumer price index] could not reduce the allowance, the Legislature arguably treated the base pension amount as the benefit, protected against deflationary
reduction, and COLA increases as potentially temporary adjustments to that benefit” (internal citation omitted)). The government in Maine Ass’n of Retirees asserted (and the appellate
court agreed) that the base pension benefit was distinct from the COLA because the applicable and former statutory provisions for COLAs described them as “adjustments” to the
benefit and because COLAs are contingent on the extra system factors like the Consumer
Price Index. Id. at 31. It underscored that the COLA formula itself distinguished between
the COLA and the base pension amount. Id.
294. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451,
467 (1985) (remarking that a reservation of right to amend “is hardly the language of contract”); discussion supra Section II.B.1.
295. See, e.g., Me. Ass’n of Retirees, 758 F.3d at 31 (ruling that the legislature’s inclusion of
an express right to amend the statutory provision at issue negates any potential contract).
Although not utilizing the “no contract” canon in Contract Clause contests, the Washington
Supreme Court has had several (pension and non-pension) cases developing the dimensions of when a reservation clause is enforceable. See Wash. Educ. Ass’n v. Wash. Dep’t of
Ret. Sys., 332 P.3d 439, 4445–46 (Wash. 2014). Basically, the clause must be crystal clear. See
id.
296. See, e.g., Berg, 137 A.3d at 1155–56 (ascertaining the meaning of terms in related
statutes that are incorporated by reference and the common definition of key words across
statutes). This is often called an intertextual argument. Akhil Amar, Intratextualism, 112
HARV. L. REV. 747, 800 (19991) (defining intertextualism and contrasting it with intratextualism where judges compare the words and their position in the same statute). Berg illustrates an intratextual analysis as well. See id. at 1157 (noting textual distinctions in the same
statute between the phrases “pension retirement benefits” and “pension adjustment benefits”).
297. See HUHN, supra 30, at 34–39 (listing evidence of intent as drawn from the text of
the law, from previous versions of the text, from its drafting history, from official comments,
or from contemporary commentary).
298. See Me. Ass’n of Retirees, 758 F.3d at 30–31 (examining Maine pension system); Berg,
137 A.3d at 1160–62 (reviewing prior enactments).
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over the years to the pension-related provisions likely dooms a
299
finding of contract.
Courts also refer to the history of the text, including the historical background of the law as well as the sequence of events leading
300
up to its enactment. The order of events has been particularly
persuasive for courts considering the constitutionality of public
301
302
pension reform. But in Cranston Firefighters v. Raimondo, even
the unique negotiating history that resulted in the pension statute
was deemed inadequate. 303 There, the city police and firefighters
had transferred their pensions to the state pension system after a
negotiation resulted in special legislation to which they claimed a
304
contractual interest. The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
the notion that these circumstances amounted to a contract and
305
declared the negotiation equivalent to lobbying.
In addition, as part of the history of the text, judges looked at
the legislative (drafting) history of the law alleged to be a con306
tract. Other courts announced that legislative history was rele299. See Taylor v. City of Gladsden, 767 F.3d 1124, 1129 (11th Cir. 2014) (reviewing Alabama law) (observing that the contribution rate had been amended six times over the
course of several decades); Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 212 (Colo. 2014) (“Modifications
over the past half century reflect the legislature’s unbridled management of the COLA.”);
Berg, 137 A.3d at 1161 (holding that the number of changes to the COLA over the years
supported the presumption against contract). Contra R.I. Pub. Emps.’ Retiree Coal. v.
Chafee, No. PC123166, 2014 WL 1577496 at *6, *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2014) (treating
COLAS and benefits the same despite apparent changes to pension legislation since the retirement system was created by legislation).
300. Independent of Contract Clause challenges, the U.S. Supreme Court has specified
sources of evidence to determine government intent: historical background of the decision,
the specific sequence of events leading up the decision, departures from normal procedures, legislative history, and testimony of official concerning the purpose of the action. See
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
301. See, e.g., Fry v. City of Los Angeles, 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694, 703–04 (Ct. App. 2016)
(considering the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged City Council’s
Freeze Ordinance that froze the maximum health insurance subsidy at the rate in effect in
2011). In Fry, these events were prior enactments, such as the 2005 Charter Amendment and
subsequent ordinance by which the Council set a subsidy amount, as well as the 2006 Delegation Ordinance that authorized the Board of Pension Commissioners to change the
amount in their discretion. Id. at 703.
302. 880 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2018).
303. See id. at 50; cf. U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1977) (finding statutory contract in view of savings and loan crisis that precipitated covenant with bondholders).
304. Cranston Firefighters, 880 F.3d at 50.
305. Id. at 50–51.
306. U.S. Tr. Co., 431 U.S. at 17–18 n.14. For example, in Justus v. State, the Colorado
Supreme Court relied on legislative history in deciding whether the legislature intended to
create an unchangeable COLA formula. See 336 P.3d 202, 211–212 (Colo. 2014) (“[T]he
legislature did not create a contract right to a COLA in the 1994 COLA amendment because
the 1993 legislative history indicated that no member of the General Assembly expressed
intent to create an unchangeable COLA from that date forward.” (citing House Finance
Committee Hearing on SB 93–1324, 1993 Legis., at 5:6–10 (Colo. Mar. 24, 1993)). Without
applying the “no contract” canon, the Supreme Court of Illinois in Jones v. Municipal Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund relied on legislative history in the form of constitutional convention debates (as determined in a prior precedent) to interpret the state constitution’s pen-
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vant to the contract inquiry but failed to use it. In at least one
308
state, legislative history is not recorded. Moreover, in Berg v.
Christie, the Supreme Court of New Jersey conditioned the use of
legislative history on the statute being ambiguous (although it re309
sorted to the drafting history as an alternative argument).
Commentary on the meaning of the text is another category of
evidence bearing on the intent of the legislature in the latest pen310
311
sion reform cases. In Taylor v. City of Gladsden, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals (reviewing Alabama law) noted that the
official pension handbook acknowledged that the pension provi312
313
sions could change. Comparably, in Borders v. City of Atlanta,

sion clause. 50 N.E.3d 596, 605 (Ill. 2016) (citing McNamee v. State, 672 N.E.2d 1159 (Ill.
1996) (ruling that the constitutional pension clause creates contractual rights only to receive benefits and not to control funding)).
307. The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Maine Ass’n of Retirees v. Board of Trustees of the
Maine Public Employees Retirement System indicated that legislative history was part of the circumstances available to rebut the presumption. 758 F.3d 23, 30 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing R.I.
Bd. of Corr. Offs. v. Rhode Island, 357 F.3d 42, 46 n.3 (1st Cir. 2004)) (“[A] litigant seeking
to overcome the hurdle of the unmistakability doctrine may rely on not only the words used
[in the statute] but also apparent purpose, context, and any pertinent evidence of actual
intent, including legislative history.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nonetheless, it
indicated that such history was not relevant to its decision. Id. at 26 (“The district court provided a thorough review of the legislative history of MePERS and its predecessors, . . . and
we need not repeat it here to answer the narrow question before us[.]”) (Me. Ass’n of Retirees v. Bd. of Trs. of Me. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 954 F. Supp. 2d 38, 41–46 (D. Me. 2013)).
The California Supreme Court in Cal Fire also agreed that legislative history could constitute
an implied intent to contract. Cal Fire Local 2881 v. Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 435 P.3d 433,
446 (Cal. 2019). As did the trial court in Rhode Island, R.I. Pub. Emps.’ Retiree Coal. v.
Chafee, No. PC123166, 2014 WL 1577496 at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2014), though neither court had occasion to use it. See Cal Fire, 435 P.3d at 446; R.I. Pub. Emps.’ Retiree Coal.,
2014 WL 1577496, at *4 (“In addition to the statutory language, the relationship between
the parties may be examined to determine the apparent purpose, context, and any pertinent evidence of actual intent, including legislative history, in support of a contractual relationship.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)).
308. See Cranston Firefighters v. Raimondo, 880 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 2018) (assessing
changes to a Rhode Island pension scheme). In Moro v. State, the Supreme Court of Oregon
considered what it called “legislative history” to ascertain whether cost-of-living allowances
(COLAs) were terms of the pension contract, but what it actually examined was the history
of the COLA laws and not the drafting history of a particular law that purportedly constituted a contract. 351 P.3d 1, 30–32 (Ore. 2015).
309. Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1159 (N.J. 2016). Relying on a non-pension, nonContract Clause precedent, the New Jersey Supreme Court found this type of evidence to be
inapplicable “unless there is some ambiguity on the face of the statute itself.” Id. (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 874 A.2d 1039, 1048–49 (N.J. 2005)). In the alternative, it held that the
legislative history was wanting as well. Id. at 1159. It examined a committee statement accompanying the statute that failed to refer to COLAs as contracts and a transcript of a legislative hearing on the pension system conducted primarily by those who never passed on the
bill. Id. at 1159–60.
310. HUHN, supra 30, at 39.
311. 767 F.3d 1124 (11th Cir. 2014).
312. See id. at 1134 (reasoning that an official handbook reviewed by the employees before deciding on the plan explicitly stated that the contribution amount is subject to change
by the Alabama legislature).
313. 779 S.E.2d 279 (Ga. 2015).
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the Supreme Court of Georgia relied on the plan enrollment materials that gave notice that the pension plan provisions could be
314
altered. In contrast, courts have not found persuasive similar
contemporary materials declaring that pension provisions are con315
tracts.
3. Evaluation
Unlike the remedial canon that has received so much scholarly
attention (and criticism), the “no contract” canon has received
very little, if any, consideration. Perhaps due to its narrowness in
applying solely to Contract Clause challenges involving legislation—making the canon both method and doctrine—it has been
316
overlooked in the canons literature. The foregoing analysis has
sought to fill this space. Among other things, it identifies the canon’s origins, underlying philosophy, and the extent to which courts
apply it.
Ironically, federal law supplies the source of authority for the
317
description and strength of the canon qua clear statement rule.
This may be unexpected given the U.S. Supreme Court’s insistence
on deference to the state law of contract even in federal constitu318
tional Contract Clause claims. The canon is also treated as precedent (not merely methodology) in both federal and state courts
319
considering whether pension law constitutes a contract. It is notable too that following federal law further, state courts have
stretched the “no contract” canon to cover contract existence and
320
interpretation (including what the terms require). Arguably, at
least in those states that do not use the canon, federal courts could

314. Id. at 285–86 (concluding that the plan enrollment materials that were set by state
legislature explicitly provided for changes so the employees consented to prospective
changes in their contribution rates). Notably, the court invoked the default rules of private
contract law and not the “no contract” canon for government contracts. See id. at 285.
315. See Cal Fire Local 2881 v. California Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 435 P.3d 433, 454 (Cal.
2019) (CalPERS publication).
316. Yet other constricted canons like the equity canon, and especially the Chevron canon, have had their fair share of critique. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392 (2017) (providing an overview of arguments opposing the Chevron canon).
317. See supra Section II.B.2.a.
318. See supra note 210. While the question of contract under the federal Contract
Clause is one of federal and not state law, Me. Ass’n of Retirees v. Bd. Of Trs. Of the Me.
Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 758 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2014), federal courts “accord respectful consideration and great weight to the views of the state’s highest court.” Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
319. See supra Section II.B.
320. See, e.g., Moro v. State, 351 P.3d 1, 36–37 (Ore. 2015); see also Anenson et al., supra
note 11, at 55.
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violate the Erie doctrine when applying the federal unmistakability
doctrine to determine whether a contract exists under the Con321
tract Clause of a state constitution. In applying the “no contract”
canon, though, federal and state courts have looked to persuasive
authority from other jurisdictions dealing with the same type of
322
pension reform in addition to their own precedent.
Judges have endorsed the twin rationales of legislative intent
and separation of powers. So, the legislative authority-accepting
edict may be seen as a normative as well as a descriptive assump323
tion about the legislative process. The canon not only helps figure out what statutes are trying to achieve but also answers broad
institutional questions about the relationship between courts and
324
legislatures.
The majority (but certainly not all) of the new constitutional
cases use the “no contract” canon in construing legislation to dis325
cern the existence of a pension contract. In most of those cases,
employees did not overcome the assumption against unchangeable
legislative agreements. This is true despite the availability of a
broad list of rebuttal evidence that could include purpose, context,
326
and legislative history. Although a few courts emphasized text as
the essential indicator of contractual intent, implied-in-fact contracts are possible in theory. Again, in outlining the sources of
proof outside of the text itself, those sources were unlikely to overcome the presumption against contract. Indeed, if anything, other
types of evidence worked in favor of the government employer. In
particular, all but one court (a trial court) took statutory changes
327
to mean a lack of contractual intent. Supplemental commentary
on the statutory provisions additionally worked against the employee. In a kind of “heads-I-win, tails-you-lose” scenario, courts
found advice that the pension benefits were not contracts persua-

321. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal
courts must resolve issues not governed by positive federal law—that is, statutes, treaties, and
the Constitution—according to state law); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation:
Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011) (arguing that Erie requires federal courts to apply state rules of statutory construction when interpreting state
law).
322. See supra Section II.B.2.a.
323. See supra Section II.B.2.b.; infra Part III.
324. See Shapiro, supra note 21, at 924; supra Section II.B.2.b.
325. See infra Appendix; Anenson et al., supra note 11, at 27–37.
326. See supra Section II.B.2.d.
327. See supra Section II.B.2.d. While many courts considered the history of statutory
changes leading up to the alleged statutory contract, the Berg court took the analysis one
step further by declaring that the reform statute itself indicated the lack of an intent to contract. Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1162 (N.J. 2016).
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sive, whereas similar advice that they were contracts was disregard328
ed.
Legislative history was almost universally available to rebut the
329
presumption against contractual intent. Courts considered this
evidence, which it has been the subject of heated debate in schol330
arly circles. Legislative history is the most common evidence of
331
intent. Without it, proving a clear and unmistakable contract
would be even more difficult.
A few state supreme courts allow the employment context to au332
tomatically rebut the presumption. In doing so, these courts were
333
following precedent. But it did not affect the outcome. They either determined that the pension reform provision at issue was not
334
a term of the contract or, if a term, it was not unchangeable.
Hence, the general complaint described in Part I about “loose
canons” that apply irrespective of their environment does not seem
335
to hold.
Probably the most stringent reading of the “no contract” canon
is in those cases where a clear contract could not exist if the government proposes a possible alternative interpretation. The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Berg v. Christie underscored that a
Contract Clause challenge to public pension reform is not an or336
dinary statutory interpretation case. It found both sides made
“reasonable” arguments that were in some respects “equally per337
suasive,” but that its job was not to choose which argument more
338
likely reflected the legislative intent. Rather, the court declared
that it was the plaintiffs’ burden to prove that the intent to contract
339
was unmistakable, which they failed to do. Thus, the supreme
court ruled that the retired government employees could not pre-

328. See supra Section II.B.2.d.
329. See supra Section II.B.2.d.
330. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 21, at 956 n.177 (outlining legislative history debate).
331. See HUHN, supra note 30, at 38 (clarifying that as a bill becomes law, each step in the
legislative process is documented); ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 36 (1997) (listing types of legislative history by importance, beginning with committee reports, markup transcripts, committee debate and hearing transcripts, and transcripts of actual floor debate).
332. See, e.g., Cal Fire Local 2881 v. Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 435 P.3d 433, 446–48 (Cal.
2019); Moro v. State, 351 P.3d 1, 21 (Ore. 2015).
333. Cal Fire, 435 P.3d at 446–48; Moro, 351 P.3d at 21; accord Krishnakumar, supra note
25, at 826 (empirical study concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court’s own precedents are
“the unsung gap-filling mechanism that the justices turn to when confronted with unclear
statutory text”).
334. See, e.g., Cal Fire, 435 P.3d at 447–53; Moro, 351 P.3d at 36–37.
335. See discussion supra Part I and infra Part III.
336. Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1158 (N.J. 2016).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1158–59.
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340

vail on their Contract Clause claim. Similarly, two plausible opposing arguments negated a pension contract in Cranston Firefight341
ers v. Raimondo. In construing a Rhode Island pension scheme,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals declared that the ambiguity inherent in the different reading meant that the language failed to
342
indicate a statutory contract.
Finally, application of the clear statement rule is not entirely
uniform. Most courts apply it at the beginning of the interpretative
exercise, but a minority of courts invoke the canon only if the lan343
guage of the statute is ambiguous.
C. Constitutional Avoidance Canon
The constitutional avoidance canon evades the undesirable consequence of interpreting a statute in opposition to the U.S. Consti344
tution or a state constitution. There are two versions of the
avoidance canon: the unconstitutionality canon and the doubts
345
canon. The former version avoids an interpretation that would
346
render the statute unconstitutional. The latter version avoids
constitutional concerns even when the broader interpretation
347
would not be invalid. Both versions influenced the public pension reform cases.
1. Overview
The unconstitutionality canon originated shortly after the “no
contract” canon in a case authored by Justice Joseph Story in

340. Id. at 1162.
341. 880 F.3d 44, 48–49 (1st Cir. 2018) (endorsing prior decision in Parker wherein the
word “due” could mean currently due because the employee had retired and the benefits
were payable or vested and payable in the future).
342. Id. (assessing changes to a Rhode Island pension scheme).
343. See R.I. Council 94 v. Chafee, No. PC 12-3168, 2014 WL 1743149, at *5 (R.I. Super.
Ct. Apr. 25, 2014) (conditioning canon on ambiguity); accord Borders v. Atlanta, 779 S.E.2d
279, 285 (Ga. 2015) (conditioning private law contract canons on textual ambiguity and explaining that if canons do not resolve the ambiguity then the issue is for the jury).
344. See Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus Avoiding Unconstitutionality,
128 HARV. L. REV. F. 331 (2015) (reviewing Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active
Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109 (2015)).
345. Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1020–21.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 1021; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 459 (explaining that the doubts canon is construed so as to steer clear of constitutional doubt).
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1814. It matured in the late nineteenth century. The U.S. Supreme Court created the doubts canon almost a century later in
350
1909, although it was popularized in 1936 by Justice Brandeis in a
351
concurring opinion. Both versions of the avoidance canon had
their genesis in the federal courts and were later followed by the
state courts.
The avoidance canon arose with the power of judicial review af352
ter the adoption of the U.S. Constitution. As a result of the extraordinary authority to strike down legislation, judges gave assurances that they would not exercise it unless they had no reasonable
alternative. Similar to the “no contract” canon, courts described
the avoidance canon as a means of effectuating legislative intent
353
and furthering separation of powers. Unlike the remedial canon,
which has antecedents in English law, and like the unmistakability
doctrine, the avoidance canon is American-made.
Even earlier than the avoidance canon itself, courts construed
statutes during the first fifty years after the founding so as to avoid
nullifying actual or potential constitutional conflicts under the
354
“clear case” standard of review. This standard of proof was trans-

348. See Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 769 (Story,
Circuit Justice, C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156); Barrett, supra note 31, at 139, 140–41 n.144
(listing cases as early as 1800 intimating the canon).
349. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 139, 142 (tracing the avoidance canon to early treatises
and case law).
350. See United States ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909);
John Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1496
(1997) (identifying the genesis of the doubts canon).
351. See Nagle, supra note 350, at 1495–96; Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S.
288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J. concurring).
352. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 139 (citing G.A. ENDLICH, A COMMENTARY ON THE
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES § 178, at 246 (1888)) (describing avoidance canon as “[a]
presumption of much importance in this country, but, of course unknown in England,
where the courts cannot question the authority of Parliament, or assign any limits to its
power”).
353. See id. at 143 (mentioning that the avoidance canon often supports legislative intent). For cases illustrating the separation of powers rationale, see State v. Lubee, 45 A. 520,
521 (Me. 1899) (“ ‘It is but a decent respect,’ says Mr. Justice Washington in Ogden v. Saunders. . . ‘due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by which
any law is passed, to presume in favor of its validity until its violation is proved beyond all
reasonable doubt.’ ”); State v. Brockwell, 193 S.E. 378, 379 (N.C. 1936) (“This principle is
founded upon a proper respect for the intelligence and good faith of a co-ordinate department of the state government, which derives its authority from, and is responsible to, the
people of the State, as is the case with the judicial department.”); and State v. Ide, 77 P. 961,
962 (Wash. 1904) (“We have mentioned these well-established rules because we believe that
they should always be kept in mind when the court is called upon to declare invalid an act of
the lawmaking body, a co-ordinate and independent department of the government.”).
354. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 140 (“[T]he ‘very clear case’ rationale is the most
common formulation of the general proposition that courts should avoid striking down
statutes for unconstitutionality.”). According to Professor (now Justice) Amy Coney Barrett,
the first case adopting the rule appears to be from 1796. See id. (quoting Hylton v. United
States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796)).
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formed forty years later into “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Though technically not an assumption, courts often combine the
standard and canon whereby the standard is the measure of evi356
dence needed for rebuttal.
The constitutional avoidance canon has been subject to intense
357
debate. Scholars have supported the canon on the grounds that
it gives constitutionally protected interests an added measure of
358
breathing space. Professor Cass Sunstein, in particular, has endorsed the canon because it provides implicit interpretive instructions to the legislature. 359 In his view, the aim of the canon is to
360
capture an actual or hypothetical legislative judgment. As a general matter, the avoidance norm tracks an understanding about
how a legislature would want courts to interpret legislation: that
statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional invalidity and
not to figure out the precise meaning in a particular case. Accordingly, the canon can be justified as an accurate reflection of a preference for validation rather than invalidation.
Most of the legal community, however, is more critical. Exceeding even the criticism of the remedial canon, scholars condemn
361
the avoidance canon on authority or rule of law grounds. A few

355. Both federal and state law seemed to spring from an opinion by Justice Washington
in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827); cf. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (2
Wheat.) 213, 294 (1827) (Thompson, J., concurring) (articulating the “clear” standard).
356. In Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, one of the commonly cited U.S. Supreme Court
cases in public pension reform litigation, Justice Black in dissent cited the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 303 U.S. 95, 110 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (concluding that “the
record does not disclose beyond a reasonable doubt” that the state statute “surrendered its
sovereign, governmental right to change and alter at will legislative policy related the public
welfare.”).
357. See Krishnakumar, supra note 25, at 834 (calling the avoidance canon one of the
most famous substantive canons). For a sampling of the literature, see, for example, JERRY L.
MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW
105 (1997) (calling the avoidance canon suboptimal given game theory analysis); Katyal &
Schmidt, supra note 344, at 2129–53 (evaluating the use of the avoidance canon in recent
Supreme Court cases); Harry H. Wellington, Machinists v. Street: Statutory Interpretation and
the Avoidance of Constitutional Issues, 1961 S. CT. REV. 49, 49–50, 73 (faulting a specific application of the avoidance canon).
358. Shapiro, supra note 21, at 941.
359. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 456.
360. Id.
361. For power problems, see William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a
Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 834–35 (2001), which calls for the abandonment of the avoidance canon on separation-of-powers grounds; John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 S. CT. REV. 223, 228, which criticizes the enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine through the use of the avoidance canon; Richard
A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800,
816 (1983), which argues that the avoidance canon creates a “judge-made penumbra” with a
similar prohibitory effect as the Constitution; and Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited,
1995 S. CT. REV. 71, 94–95, which criticizes the avoidance canon as being disguised judicial
activism. For rule of law issues, see Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional
Doubts: The Supreme Court’s Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
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judges (either in their decisions or extrajudicial writings) have also
taken aim at this canon, usually complaining that it is a form of ju362
dicial activism. Yet despite these long-standing complaints, state
and federal judges still apply the canon of constitutional avoidance
with remarkable regularity. In fact, as analyzed below, the avoidance canon is a repeated incantation by judges faced with constitutional challenges to public pension reform.
2. Application
There are ten public pension reform cases across eight states
363
where judges have invoked the constitutional avoidance canon.
In all but one case, courts applied the unconstitutionality and not
364
the doubts canon. Courts also almost unfailingly invoked the
365
canon at the beginning of the interpretative exercise. The effect
of the canon’s application is that judges basically assume that the
366
statute at issue is constitutional. As such, the canon appears to
operate as a burden allocator. For example, the Supreme Court of
367
Arizona in Fields v. Elected Officials’ Retirement Plan declared: “We
presume that the statute is constitutional, and a ‘party asserting its
unconstitutionality bears the burden of overcoming the presumpREV. 1, 12 (1996), which analyzes the Supreme Court’s invocation of the avoidance canon
and concludes that it “has neither determined how much ambiguity is required to apply the
canon, nor has it suggested guidelines, factors or circumstances to include in an ambiguity
analysis.”
362. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 314 n.9 (1993) (describing the avoidance canon as
“the last refuge of many an interpretive lost cause”); Clay v. Sun Ins. Off. Ltd., 363 U.S. 207,
213–14 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting) (reproaching the Court for “carrying the doctrine of
avoiding constitutional questions to a wholly unjustifiable extreme,” and insisting that “there
are times when a constitutional question is so important that it should be decided even
though judicial ingenuity would find a way to escape it”); Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in FELIX FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE 30, 45 (Wallace Mendelson ed., 1964) (warning that the avoidance canon risks judicial rewriting of statutes);
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 284–86 (1985) (fearing aggrandizement of the court via interpretation). These studies have focused on the federal
bench, especially the Supreme Court.
363. The cases include seven majority opinions and one dissent from the following
states: California, Colorado, New Hampshire, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, and
Washington. See infra Appendix. Two Arizona Supreme Court decisions also used the canon,
but to interpret the state Pension Clause. Id.
364. See Pro. Fire Fighters of N.H. v. State, 107 A.3d 1229, 1233 (N.H. 2014) (“When
doubts exist as to the constitutionality of a statute, those doubts must be resolved in favor of
its constitutionality.”) (citing Bd. of Trs., N.H. Jud. Ret. Plan v. Sec’y of State, 7 A.3d 1166,
1233 (N.H. 2010)). The Supreme Court of New Hampshire actually articulated both versions of the avoidance canon. See Bd. of Trs., N.H. Jud. Ret. Plan, 7 A.3d at 1171.
365. See, e.g., Pro. Fire Fighters, 107 A.3d at 1233 (N.H. 2014).
366. See, e.g., Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1162 (N.J. 2016) (The statute “enjoys a presumption of constitutionality”); Wash. Educ. Ass’n v. Wash. Dept. of Ret. Sys., 332 P.3d 439,
443 (Wash. 2014) (“This court presumes that statutes are constitutional as enacted.”).
367. 320 P.3d 1160 (Ariz. 2014).
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368

tion.’ ” Seen in this light, the assumption of constitutionality does
not appear to do anything more than what the procedural law al369
ready requires; that is, the plaintiff must prove the case.
All the same, in many decisions applying the avoidance canon,
courts elevated the burden of proof to “beyond a reasonable
370
doubt” as opposed to a mere “preponderance of the evidence.”
Other courts set alternative burdens like “inescapable,” which are
371
perhaps as high. Certain courts articulateded the traditional
burden as requiring the constitutional violation be “clear” 372 or at
373
least “free from all reasonable ambiguity.” This standard appears
374
closest to the burden for overcoming the “no contract” canon.
The rationales of the avoidance and “no contract” canon also
overlap. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s lead in United States v.
375
Winstar Corp., the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Berg v. Chris376
tie listed constitutional avoidance as one of the two purposes of
the unmistakability principle. 377 This symmetry makes sense because the avoidance canon applies to all constitutional claims while
the unmistakability doctrine is restricted to one reason that the leg-

368. Id. at 1164 (quoting Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 748 (Ariz. 1977)); accord
Hall v. Elected Offs.’ Ret. Plan, 383 P.3d 1107, 1112 (Ariz. 2016) (addressing whether a
change to a state pension plan violated the Pension Clause of state constitution).
369. Some courts do not specify what level of proof is necessary to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. See Hall, 383 P.3d at 1113; Berg, 137 A.3d at 1162.
370. See, e.g., Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 208 (Colo. 2014) (“We begin with the presumption that a statute is constitutional; we uphold the statute unless it is proved to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (citing E–470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig,
91 P.3d 1038, 1041 (Colo. 2004)); Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 332 P.3d at 443 (“This court presumes
that statutes are constitutional as enacted. The challenging party, in this case the respondents, must establish that there is no reasonable doubt that the statute violates the constitution.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). North Carolina appellate courts likewise
“presume[] that statutes passed by the General Assembly are constitutional, and duly passed
acts will not be struck unless found [to be] unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Lake v. State Health Plan for Tchrs. & State Emps., 825 S.E.2d 645, 650 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019)
(quoting N.C. Ass’n of Educs. v. State, 368 N.C. 777, 786, 786 S.E.2d 255, 262 (2016) (citations omitted)). The North Carolina Supreme Court first articulated the reasonable doubt
standard in 1936 without citation. See State v. Brockwell, 183 S.E. 378, 379 (N.C. 1936).
371. See Pro. Fire Fighters of N.H. v. State, 107 A.3d 1229, 1233 (N.H. 2014) (holding
that the legislation “will not be declared to be invalid except upon inescapable grounds”).
372. See AFT Mich. v. State, 893 N.W.2d 90, 104 (Mich. App. 2016) (Saad, J., dissenting)
(“I begin with the established principle that legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional absent a clear showing to the contrary.”).
373. Marin Ass’n of Pub. Emps. v. Marin Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365,
388 (Ct. App. 2016) (“The party asserting a contract clause claim has the burden of
‘mak[ing] out a clear case, free from all reasonable ambiguity,’ [that] a constitutional violation occurred.” (citations omitted)), review denied, S237460, 2020 WL 5667326 (Cal. Sept. 23,
2020) (mem.).
374. In fact, in Marin Ass’n of Public Employees, the appellate court used the avoidance
canon for a Contract Clause challenge without citing any other canons. See id. at 388–89.
375. 518 U.S. 839, 875 (1996) (plurality opinion); see supra Section II.B.2.
376. 137 A.3d 1143 (N.J. 2016).
377. Id. at 1153.
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378

islation is unconstitutional: it violates the Contract Clause. In applying both canons, the Berg majority explained the relationship by
stating that “the Legislature’s view that its prior [pension statute]
did not prevent future [changes] is relevant to our considera379
tion.”
Most of the public pension opinions do not elaborate on the
philosophy of the avoidance canon, but the same theory of preserving separation of powers and legislative intent can be found in
380
each state’s earlier decisions. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire did suggest a separation of powers rationale in its latest public pension decision. In Professional Fire Fighters of New Hampshire v.
381
State, the court explained: “The constitutionality of an act passed
by the coordinate branch of the government is to be presumed . . .
and the operation under it of another department of the state government will not be interfered with until the matter has received
382
full and deliberate consideration.”
Concerning court recognition of conflicts among the canons, in
only one case where lawyers raised the remedial canon did a court
acknowledge the contradiction between it and the avoidance canon. In Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n v. Alameda County Em383
ployees’ Retirement Ass’n, the California Court of Appeals opined
that it was the employees’ burden to prove a constitutional violation in the form of a prior contract despite observing that the re384
medial canon requires the opposite presumption. Although the
court pointed out the incongruence between these two canons, it
never resolved the issue. The courts that have cited the “no contract” canon and the avoidance canon, which both operate against
a contract for pension benefits, have not distinguished between
385
them.
3. Evaluation
The constitutional avoidance canon is a presumption that provides a default answer as to whether a statute is valid. In this regard, judges in the new pension cases do more than fill in a gap
378.
Note, of course, that the “no contract” canon applies to the former legislation
while the avoidance canons applies to the later reform legislation.
379. Berg, 137 A.3d at 1162.
380. See, e.g., State v. Brockwell, 193 S.E. 378, 379 (N.C. 1936).
381. 107 A.3d 1229 (N.H. 2014).
382. Id. at 1233 (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).
383. 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787 (Ct. App. 2018), rev’d on other grounds, 470 P.3d 85 (Cal. 2020).
384. See id. at 804.
385. See, e.g., Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1162 (N.J. 2016) (indicating that both canons operate to presume there is no statutory contract to pension benefits).
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left open by statutory silence. But it is difficult to tell how far a
court is willing to push the statutory language to escape unconstitutionality. Approximating the unmistakability doctrine, courts
seem to require the legislature to speak with particularity in order
to achieve a result contrary to the constitution.
As set forth in Section II.C.2, there are a variety of different
standards for rebutting the presumption of constitutionality. Some
courts state no standard at all whereas others require proof beyond
386
a reasonable doubt. Certain courts describe the standard as “inescapable” or, as with the “no contract” canon, specify simply that
387
the showing be “clear.” Consequently, the avoidance assumption
can carry different degrees of strength. Because it is often invoked
in conjunction with the “no contract” canon, the canon of constitutional avoidance appears to be of secondary weight. The avoidance canon usually appears as part of the background discussion at
the beginning or end of the opinion and rarely makes it into the
388
analysis.
Because courts sometimes invoke the avoidance canon even
without the “no contract” canon, the former seems to serve as a
substitute for the latter. For those states or courts that fail to employ the “no contract” canon, the avoidance canon has more
389
teeth. This is particularly apposite with the “clear” standard for
rebuttal. When courts use both canons, however, the “no contract”
canon does the heavy lifting.
Courts appear to have a relatively uniform understanding of why
they are applying the avoidance canon: to save as much law as possible from nullification. There are oblique references to the canon’s foundation in the separation of powers concept with some
390
courts treating the canon as a proxy for legislative intent. No
doubt extolling on its philosophy seems unnecessary for such a
wide-ranging canon (applicable to all legislative provisions being
challenged as unconstitutional) because it is an established part of
the interpretative lexicon. As a final point, akin to the “no con391
tract” canon, most courts begin with the avoidance canon. Oth-

386. See discussion supra Section II.C.2.
387. See discussion supra Section II.C.2.
388. See, e.g., Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1162 (N.J. 2016) (citing avoidance canon at
end of analysis). Compare Hall v. Elected Offs.’ Ret. Plan, 383 P.3d 1107, 1113 (Ariz. 2016)
(citing avoidance canon at the beginning of discussion) with id. at 1131 (Bolick, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing same canon at the end of the decision).
389. See discussion supra Section II.C.2.
390. See discussion supra Section II.C.2.
391. See discussion supra Section II.C.2.
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ers do not apply it unless the language is ambiguous such that the
392
plain meaning rule prevails.
III. CHOOSING AND COMMUNICATING CANONS
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that canons are a pervasive
feature of the public pension law landscape. Given the continuing
national pension crisis as well as the impact of methodology on the
constitutionality of reforms, it is high noon for these dueling canons of construction. The previous examination provides a necessary framework with which to answer important doctrinal, jurisprudential, and theoretical questions. For example, which canons,
if any, are appropriate as interpretative aids in construing public
pension legislation? If their use is justified, when are they properly
applied? In other words, how should courts employ a canon or
canons? What are (or should be) the limitations of the canon(s)?
What values do canons serve? Are they justified on judicial authority and rule of law grounds?
The central aim of this study is to make it easier to understand
the actual dynamics of the interpretative process. A detailed documentation should provide a clear background against which legislatures and courts can do their work. It should also increase candor
and transparency in the interpretation of legislation involving public pension benefits. It should additionally clarify the condition of
393
contract obligation in the constitutional analysis.
A. Importance of Canon Choice
As an initial matter, it is worth emphasizing that the choice of
canons can be outcome determinative. In a majority of the courts
studied, the “no contract” canon applies at the beginning of the
analysis and a clear statement (albeit an implicit one) is required
394
to negate its application. So, too, with the constitutional avoid395
ance canon. Most courts assume statutes are constitutional at the
start of the interpretative enterprise and this assumption is overcome only with a level of clarity that is beyond a reasonable
396
doubt. Clarity also negates the remedial canon, but a liberal con392. See discussion supra Section II.C.2.
393. See ELY, supra note 9, at 1 (explaining that “the criteria for invoking the contract
clause remain uncertain”).
394. See discussion supra Section II.B.
395. See discussion supra Section II.C.
396. See discussion supra Section II.C.
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struction is not even available unless the legislative enactment is
397
ambiguous. Thus, determining whether the written law is clear or
ambiguous precedes the possibility of resort to the remedial can398
on.
The difference in operation between the remedial and “no contract” canon is illustrated in Berg v. Christie. In its decision, the majority acknowledged that both sides had made reasonable arguments, which meant that the plaintiffs could not meet the
399
unmistakable intent standard. The fact that there were two
equally good interpretations presumably made the statute ambigu400
ous. Had the remedial canon been applicable, it would have
supported an opposing construction in favor of a contract. So,
choosing the right canon is decisive. It allows judges to put their
thumb on the scale. With the “no contract” and avoidance canons,
that scale is weighted in favor of constitutionality and against a
pension contract with unchangeable terms.
B. Suggested Canon Hierarchy
In deciding between the remedial canon and the “no contract”
canon, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Berg v. Christie traced
the tradition of the clear statement rule back to the early nine401
teenth century. The majority may have felt compelled to solidify
the foundation of the “no contract” canon given that the remedial
402
canon was a viable alternative. Remember the pedigree of the
remedial canon. It not only has English roots but also appeared in
403
venerable sources such as Blackstone. The historical foundation
of the unmistakability doctrine was obviously indispensable to the
U.S. Supreme Court as well because it corrected the canon’s ori397. See discussion supra Sections II.A.2–3; Watson, supra note 53, at 245 (discussing cases outside the public pension context that are inconsistent on whether courts begin with the
presumption or only use the remedial canon after a finding of ambiguity). Only a few courts
express a trigger of ambiguity for the avoidance or “no contract” canon. See discussion supra
Sections II.B.3, II.C.3.
398. See discussion supra Section II.A.
399. Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143, 1158–59 (N.J. 2016). The court clarified: “This is
not an ordinary statutory interpretation case, so our task here is not to determine which textually based argument is more likely than not the actual intent of the Legislature.” Id. at
1158. The same would be presumably true of the canon of constitutional avoidance. For
most courts, it too applies without a condition of ambiguity. See supra Section II.C.
400. See id. at 1158–59 (explaining that all parties made many reasonable arguments and
that “one is already outside the realm of unmistakable clarity needed to find a statutory contract right” if there is ambiguity).
401. 137 A.3d at 1152 (N.J. 2016) (citing Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 551 (1837)).
402. See id. at 1150–51; Section II.A.2.
403. See discussion supra Section II.A.1.
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404
gins in United States v. Winstar Corp. According to the Court, the
emergence of the doctrine dates to the early republic. 405 Tradition,
of course, is a key rule of law ethic and advances the value of social
406
cohesion. It is to be expected that courts highlight a canon’s history. Though pedigree does not necessarily resolve the choice. All
of the canons have an ancestry, even if the avoidance and “no contract” canons came later as unique American inventions.
The source of the canon should likewise be considered in any
potential hierarchy. The “no contract” and avoidance canons are
407
constitutionally inspired by the principle of separation of powers.
In fact, the former canon is based on inter-branch (judiciary and
the legislature) as well as intra-branch (legislature to subsequent
408
legislature) relations. Although all three canons are sensitive to
409
the democratic primacy of the legislature, the constitutional basis
of the unmistakability doctrine should defeat the remedial canon
that is tied to the particular purposes of the legislation.
Arguably, too, the remedial canon should be replaced because it
does not help with the preliminary question of whether the pen410
sion statute or ordinance constituted a contract. Relatedly, careful of the canon’s free-wheeling potential, courts have already limited application of the remedial canon selectively to one part of a
411
statute and not another. Indeed, under the private pension law
of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, whether the
legislative language should be strictly or liberally construed de412
pends on the particular provision at issue. Thus, courts are cognizant of choosing a canon of statutory construction that best fits
the situation.

404. See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
405. See Berg, 137 A.3d at 1152; discussion supra Section II.B.1.
406. See HUHN, supra note 30, at 49; T. Leigh Anenson, Equitable Defenses in the Age of Statutes, 36 REV. LITIG. 659, 668–89 (2017) (discussing the value of tradition).
407. See discussion supra Sections II.B.2.b, II.C.1.
408. See discussion supra Sections II.B.1–2.b.
409. See discussion supra Sections II.A.3, B.3, C.3.
410. Cf. Samantar v. Yousaf, 560 U.S. 305, 320 (2010) (explaining that the common law
canon helps courts interpret statutes that clearly cover the field and does not assist in answering the antecedent question).
411. See Standard Oil of Conn., Inc. vs. Adm’r, Unemployment Comp. Act, 134 A.3d 581,
608–09 (Conn. 2016) (ruling that not all portions of a statute are intended to have remedial
effect and that the application of the canon should be restrained in order to effectuate the
legislative compromise); Reisch v. State, 668 A.2d 970, 977 (Md. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining
that the remedial portion of the statute may be liberally construed while the other provisions must be strictly construed); discussion supra Section II.A.1.
412. Compare IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker & Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118,
127 (3d Cir. 1986) (using the remedial canon to assist in interpreting Section 1399 of
ERISA) with Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 233, 226 (3d Cir. 2010)
(finding that ERISA is a remedial statute but not examining congressional intent because
the meaning of Section 510 is clear).
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There are scholars, however, who would likely endorse the re413
medial canon in public pension reform litigation. For example,
even though he did not assess competing canons in particular, Professor Jack Beermann questioned the presumption against contract
414
in the government employment relationship. He has argued for
a more protective contract right to pensions for government em415
ployees than other academics studying such employee benefits.
416
His principal point is that the pension crisis is a “human crisis.”
Beermann’s rationale largely stems from the presumed reliance of
employees making a modest income, especially those who are not
417
able to participate in Social Security.
With the individual impact of public pension reform in mind,
the best evaluation of the canon controversy may be to contextualize the remedial canon. It is a meta-canon in that it is not statutespecific or even directed at a particular field. A more tailored version may fare better in confronting the “no contract” canon. Arguably, the heart of the remedial canon in the public pension context
is sensitivity to the retirement security of a potentially disadvan418
taged group. The remedial canon, viewed in this light, connotes
a public pensioner canon. There are long-settled canons that pro419
tect vulnerable groups like veterans and Native Americans. The
Indian canon can be traced to Chief Justice John Marshall who resolved an ambiguity in favor of the less powerful “unlettered peo420
ple.” This canon bears a resemblance to how courts treat con413. See generally Donald C. Carroll, The National Pension Crisis: A Test in Law, Economics,
and Morality, 50 U.S.F. L. REV. 469 (2016) (framing the debate about the pension crisis from
a moral perspective).
414. Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 51–52
(2013) (discussing state constitutional law and questioning the use of this textual canon
when the government is acting as an employer).
415. Id. at 85. The issue is whether pensions should be protected from reduction for
work not yet performed (prospective) or whether they should only protect work already performed like in the private pension world (with ERISA as the appropriate analogy) or other
employment at will contracts. Monahan, supra note 92, at 1078–79; see also Anenson et al.,
supra note 6, at 29 (more or less endorsing the same view). To date, courts have given
different answers to when a contract is formed: first day, last day, and somewhere in between. Id. at 22–27.
416. Beermann, supra note 414, at 85–86.
417. Id. at 85 (concluding that government workers “have structured their finances
and made career choices and personal decision in reliance on their pension expectations”).
418. See discussion supra Section II.A.
419. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 686–87 (1993) (asserting that the
Court will not interpret a statute to abrogate the treaty rights of Indians unless “Congress
clearly express[es] its intent to do so”).
420. Barrett, supra note 31, at 151 (citing Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381,
386 (1993)). Because the dispute in that case was between two private parties, Marshall did
not actually apply the canon. Patterson v. Jenks, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 216, 229 (1829). Marshall’s
opinion that popularized the canon though was Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 541
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tracts of adhesion and even rules of contract construction such as
421
construing contracts against the drafter. Similarly, equity judges
developed maxims and other assumptions to protect widows and
422
other defenseless parties. One might ask, therefore, whether
government employees should be a protected class for purposes of
statutory interpretation.
While not specifically addressing the canon question, our previous research is instructive. It underscored three aspects of the government employment relationship concerning pension benefits:
423
hardship, hidden action, and vulnerability. First, plan failure
424
would result in severe hardship to recipients. Employees in the
425
worst-funded plans lack the federal safety net of Social Security.
Further, unlike the private sector, the federal government does not
oversee state and local pensions nor are there any insurance pro426
grams to provide benefits when the plans fail. As Amy Monahan’s
research also illustrates, there is no effective recourse either to
compel compliance with funding requirements to avoid plan failure or to force legislatures to appropriate funds, raise taxes, or in427
cur debt in the event of insolvency. Of course, reducing pension
and related benefits does not mean eliminating them. The idea is
that the magnitude of the loss falls disproportionately on participants rather than the costs being spread across the general public
(1832), abrogated by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). See id. at 582 (M’Lean, J., concurring) (using the phrase “unlettered people”).
421. Barrett, supra note 31, at 151–52. The Indian canon began in treaty interpretation
and later evolved to statutory interpretation. Id.
422. Cf. Anenson, supra note 59, at 40 (“If used correctly and consistently, however, canons limit appellate discretion similar to the way that equitable maxims constrain trial court
discretion.”).
423. See T. Leigh Anenson, Public Pensions and Fiduciary Law: A View From Equity, 50 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 251, 266–68 (2017) (developing an equitable theory of fiduciary law for
the administration of public pensions).
424. Id. at 266 (“Failing to provide the promised retirement benefits when due results in financial devastation—or the very real possibility of such destitution—to pension
plan participants and their families.”); Dana M. Muir, Decentralized Enforcement to Combat
Financial Wrongdoing in Pensions: What Types of Watchdogs Are Necessary to Keep the Foxes Out
of the Henhouse?, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 33, 67 n.212 (2016) (“Lack of retirement plan coverage
strongly correlates with poverty of individuals in their fifties.”).
425. Anenson et al., supra note 6, at 6–7 (comparing fifty state-defined benefit pension plans for teachers and finding that the non-Social Security plans are at an even greater risk of not being able to meet promised benefit payments); see also Beermann, supra
note 414, at 20 (commenting that about one in four public employees do not contribute to Social Security).
426. Karen Eilers Lahey & T. Leigh Anenson, Public Pension Liability: Why Reform is
Necessary to Save the Retirement of State Employees, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
307, 314 (2007).
427. Amy B. Monahan, When a Promise is note a Promise: Chicago-Style Pensions, 64 UCLA L.
REV. 356, 362 (2017); Amy B. Monahan, Who’s Afraid of Good Governance? State Fiscal Crises,
Public Pension Underfunding, and the Resistance to Governance Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1317, 1322
(2014) (qualitative study of the funding and governance provision of twelve public pension
plans).
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(usually in the form of increased taxes or decreased government
428
services). Second, as we have previously advised, public pensions
429
are “shrouded in secrecy.” There is a lack of transparency as to
430
the health of the plans and no uniform standards across plans.
Moreover, critics object to overly optimistic actuarial assumptions
that minimize underfunding so that participants cannot effectively
evaluate the plans and the security of a government’s retirement
431
promises. For these reasons, Beermann compares public pension
recipients to victims of Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, except on a
lower end of the economic scale. 432 Third and relatedly, pension
433
plan participants are vulnerable due to the opacity of their plans.
Employees are not always financially literate and, in any event, will
434
be unable to assess the danger to their estimated pension savings.
There is also a mobility risk because many plans have extended forfeiture periods to encourage long service to a degree not seen in
435
the private sector. As a practical matter, too, it will be difficult to

428. See Anenson, supra note 423, at 270 (“Taxpayers will share the burden of plan insolvency when states raise taxes to cover pensions.”). In my prior research, we explained
how a seemingly small 1.5% cost-of-living allowance (COLA) reduction in one state had a
serious financial impact on pension participants. Anenson et al., supra note 6, at 33. Retirees who received a pension of $33,254 in 2009 would lose more than $165,000 in benefits
over a twenty-year period. Id. Moreover, studies suggest that eliminating a two percent compounded COLA reduces lifetime benefits by at least fifteen percent and that eliminating a
three percent COLA reduces benefits by up to twenty-five percent. Id.
429. Anenson, supra note 423, at 267.
430. See Anenson et al., supra note 6, at 42–48 (discussing public pension reporting
problems with transparency, uniformity and accuracy); Lahey & Anenson, supra note
426, at 329–31 (highlighting lack of uniformity as an obstacle to public pension reform
and advocating the adoption of the Uniform Management of Public Employees Retirement Systems Act (UMPERSA) or minimum universal disclosure rules akin to it); Daniel
J. Kaspar, Defined Benefits, Undefined Costs: Moving Toward a More Transparent Accounting of
State Public Employee Pension Plans, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 129, 153–56 (2011) (proposing federal legislation that requires states to adopt a uniform standard for the reporting
and valuation of pension funding).
431. Anenson, supra note 423, at 282–83 (“There is a growing consensus among economists and other scholars that private sector actuarial standards should be used to give
an adequate representation of the default risk.”); see also id. at 283 n.193 (collecting law,
economics, and finance literature supporting this position); Anenson et al., supra note 6, at
46–88 (noting that current reporting methods understate taxpayer liability).
432. Beermann, supra note 414, at 85–86 (commenting on the unreasonable high actuarial assumptions creating false expectations among plan participants).Whether public pension participants truly are on the lower end of the economic scale has been challenged in a
recent study. See generally Philip Armour, Mihcael D. Hurd & Susann Rohwedder, How Reliant are Older Americans on State and Local Government Pensions?, U. Mich. Ret. & Disability
Rsch. Ctr., Paper No. 2019-399 (Sept. 2019), https://mrdrc.isr.umich.edu/publications
/papers/pdf/wp399.pdf [https://perma.cc/HC44-TLR3].
433. Anenson, supra note 423, at 267–68.
434. Id. at 268.
435. Anenson et al., supra note 6, at 53 (explaining the mobility penalty of defined
benefit plans as opposed to defined contribution plans such as the 401k).
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find an equivalent job in another state with a retirement system
436
that is not in jeopardy.
So, these three criteria help to explain why the remedial canon
is used in the interpretation of employee benefits. But there are
distinctions between pensioners and other disadvantaged groups.
Namely, there has been no historic discrimination as happened
with Native Americans. Government employees, unlike veterans,
are not putting their lives on the line (with the exception of firstresponders). Pensions are simply part of their compensation,
though a deferred form of it. At bottom, the dispute appears to
center on which picture of public pensions one is drawing: pensions as welfare-enhancement (old-age support) versus pensions as
part of a worker’s total wage package.
Still, picking the most appropriate portrayal does not (necessarily) solve the clashing canons problem. The “no contract” canon
437
has a legitimate basis in government power. One might characterize it as a collision between canons that protect power and those
438
that protect rights. Yet again, the remedial canon begs the question of whether employees have contract rights at all. It is invoked
only after a finding of legislative intent to construe legislation liberally. The “no contract” canon determines legislative intent. Accordingly, the unmistakability doctrine should precede and prevail
over the remedial canon in determining the existence (and terms)
439
of a contract. The canon against a contract comes earlier in the
analysis and, in any event, is normatively more compelling in light
of the public pension experience.
C. Procedural Values
Because the “no contract” canon is (and pursuant to this analysis, should be) the prevailing paradigm for statutory construction
in the new pension cases, it is necessary to consider the values this
canon serves and preserves. There is a surprisingly scant amount of
doctrinal or theoretical research on the canon. The presumption
against contract operates as a legislative power conservation canon
and also supports Professor Shapiro’s suggestion that “close ques-

436. Anenson, supra note 423, at 268.
437. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.b.
438. See Eskridge, supra note 34, at 1084–93 (finding that the Supreme Court prefers
canons of construction that preserve procedural values such as federalism rather than substantive values like nondiscrimination).
439. There are also other theories like estoppel that may better address the reliance
claims of negatively impacted employees under a given set of circumstances. Anenson et al.,
supra note 6, at 33.
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tions of construction should be resolved in favor of continuity and
440
against change.” He argued that the status quo as an ideology is
sound because it probably best reflects what statutes mean to
achieve, respects existing rights, and retains the relationship be441
tween the judiciary and the political branches of government.
Additionally, based on the course of dealing between the
branches, presumptive activity related to legislative contracts can
442
even be seen as improving the law-making process. To begin
with, by narrowing the scope of a statute, a legislature is not afraid
to make law. 443 It is willing to legislate because courts will not go
444
too far. Moreover, narrow construction of statutes against con445
tracts leads a legislature to express itself clearly in the future.
Having legislatures adopt well-considered measures promotes elector accountability and the institutional function of responsible
government.
Furthermore, the assumption of no contractual intent is underscored by legislative reliance interests. Supreme Court opinions favoring retention of legislative power in federal law have spanned
446
more than two hundred years of statutory innovation. As discussed previously, authority for the same interpretative stance un447
der state statutes extends to the prior century. The Supreme
Court has explained: “Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘long-continued’ practice, known to and acquiesced in by
Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] had been
448
[taken] in pursuance of its consent . . . .” In particular, established judicial practice becomes part of the interpretative envi-

440. Shapiro, supra note 21, at 925. Shapiro endorsed canons of statutory construction
and other background assumptions as representing this judicial philosophy. Id. Shapiro’s
study of background assumptions and other canons of construction did not include the “no
contract” canon.
441. Id. at 941–45.
442. The demand for legislative clarity, so the argument goes, also fosters a greater level
of transparency and accountability in the legislative process. See Stephenson, supra note 35,
at 2; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 458–59 (urging acceptance of canons that promote superior
lawmaking).
443. Shapiro, supra note 21, at 934 (explaining that many canons have the effect of narrowing the scope of a statute and are less controversial than those that extend it).
444. Id. at 941.
445. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 458 (discussing casual, ill-considered, or interest-driven
measures).
446. See discussion supra Section II.A.
447. See discussion supra Section II.B.1.
448. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)); see Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1785
(2010) (“We normally assume that, when Congress enacts statutes, it is aware of relevant judicial precedent[.]”); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 486 (1991) (declaring “that Congress legislates with knowledge of our basic rules of statutory construction”).
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449
ronment in which the legislature acts. In Dodge v. Board of Educa450
tion, the single public pension case considered by the Supreme
Court, it recognized legislative reliance. The Court noted that other pension legislation had been construed by the state supreme
court to negate a contract and found that the state legislature had
451
these rulings in mind when it adopted the statute under review.
Even so, each state has its own history with the canon and there
may be minimal reliance, if any. For example, the California Supreme Court did not recognize the unmistakability doctrine until
452
2011. In consequence, only legislation enacted after that time
453
could be seen as supporting a reliance interest.
Nevertheless, regardless of the timing of acceptance, reliance
may be worth considering because the “no contract” canon is both
a rule of interpretation and a doctrine. In fact, some justices on the
454
U.S. Supreme Court have called it a defense. As a doctrine, it is
treated as precedent contrary to an overwhelming number of can455
ons in federal law. State judges tend to follow methodology case456
by-case and give canons precedential effect anyway. But aside
from one’s perspective on the merits of methodological stare deci457
sis, the “no contract” canon is both legal rule and reasoning.

449. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Case of Speluncean Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1913, 1914 (1999) (explaining that legislatures pass statutes against deeply embedded ‘norms of interpretation and defense,’ which frame the social understanding of such
statutes, just as rules of grammar and diction do.”); Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canard of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 583 (1990) (supporting settled canons
as acquiring “a sort of prescriptive validity, since the legislature presumably has them in
mind when it chooses its language”); see also Barrett, supra note 31, at 160–61 (describing
how textualists convert long-standing potentially illegitimate substantive canons into linguistic canons without subscribing to the position).
450. 302 U.S. 74 (1937).
451. Id. at 80–81.
452. Retired Emps. Ass’n of Orange Cnty., Inc. v. County of Orange, 266 P.3d 287, 295
(Cal. 2011); supra Section II.B.2.c.
453. Dodge, supra note 24, at 1584 (“The retroactive application of changed canons to
statutes enacted before the changes may result in interpretations that are different from the
ones the enacting Congresses would have expected.”); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime
Change, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1971, 1983 (2005) (discussing the negative effects of reliance on
interpretative regime change).
454. United States v. Winstar Corp. 518 U.S. 839, 861 (1996) (plurality opinion).
455. Gluck, supra note 22, at 1756. The most notable exception would be the Chevron
canon.
456. Id.
457. Compare Gluck, supra note 22, at 1757 (positing that there are expressive and fairness values attendant to having judges agree to consistent methods) with RANDY J. KOZEL,
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 153–57 (2017) (arguing against methodological stare decisis even for narrow canons like Chevron). Professor William Dodge adopts a
middle ground. While acknowledging that courts have the authority to develop and change
canons, he advises that they need to justify the decision on normative grounds, explain the
need for change using the factors that courts consider in overruling precedents, and mitigate transition costs. Dodge, supra note 24, at 1644–53.
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Precedent’s primary goal of stability in the law should extend to
this assumption.
In conclusion, due to the procedural values associated with the
458
constitutional structure, the derivation of the unmistakability
doctrine and its deployment to determine the existence of a contract can be seen as a legitimate judicial function. The legislative
authority-saving scruple that guides statutory interpretation appears to enhance rather than undermine the structural interests
imposed under the federal and state constitutions. The assumption
against contract may be justified under principles of precedent, as
a matter of legislative intent, and as facilitating inter-branch comity
grounded in the principle of separation of powers.
D. Rule of Law Norms
Another area of concern, however, is whether courts are competent in deploying canons of statutory construction. More specifically, is the “no contract” canon sound on rule of law grounds? Esteemed scholars like William Eskridge insist that canons can
provide predictability and put Congress and citizens on notice as to
459
the meaning of the law. On the other hand, Karl Llewellyn’s famous critique still lingers. His main complaint was that canons obscured analysis and allowed judges to rationalize results reached on
460
other grounds. Llewellyn’s criticism was part of his assault on
formalism and his endorsement of legal realism. His objection was
not so much to the canons themselves but to how judges used
them without articulating the real grounds for their decisions. Succinctly, his argument was that courts applied canons as a “crude
461
version of formalism.”
Two other risks related to Llewellyn’s criticism have implications
462
for the “no contract” canon in public pension reform litigation.
First, courts may be inconsistent in their invocation of these statu-

458. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 128 (observing that the historical acceptance of certain
canons of construction does not settle legitimacy but does suggest they are consistent with
constitutional limits on judicial power).
459. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 66, at 678–82 (justifying canons on grounds that they
make law more predictable and objective); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 27, at 20–21 (explaining that canons are an interpretative regime that provide the vocabulary of statutory
interpretation and concluding that they are neither good nor bad in the abstract).
460. See Eskridge, supra note 64, at 1100 (discussing Karl Llewellyn’s “nasty list” showing
that every canon has a counter-canon negating it); see generally Llewellyn, supra note 64 (arguing against covert canons that conceal legal reasoning).
461. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 452.
462. See Schacter, supra note 35, at 650 (describing a competency critique that judges
lack skills and resources to create and use certain kinds of normative canons).
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463

tory default rules. Second, the judicial practice of presumptions
464
may lead to an unacceptable degree of uncertainty in the law. As
shown in Part II, it is difficult to discern when a presumption applies. For example, does it operate at the beginning of the interpretative exercise or is it activated only by a finding of ambiguity?
465
Specifically, are the assumptions displaced or rebutted? Courts
have reached different conclusions, but the “no contract” canon
(as well as the avoidance canon) is almost uniformly applied at the
466
beginning of the analysis.
The more substantial problem seems to be discerning whether
the legislation is “clear” as opposed to “ambiguous” for a successful
rebuttal. Distinguishing between when the language is plain versus
equivocal is an enduring source of conflict for all canons. Much
467
depends on how ambiguity is defined. And having to determine
which interpretative modes can be used, if any, to discern clarity
adds to the difficulty. For example, should courts consider only
textual evidence or should they include extra-textual (extrinsic)
sources? Confusion regarding this antecedent issue yields results
that are somewhat uncertain. In the new public pension reform
cases, differing levels of courts had opposing views as to whether a
468
statute was clear or ambiguous. Judges on the same court also di469
verged on this fundamental issue. A certain degree of disagreement is normal (and even desirable) in making tough decisions.
470
Hard cases require judgment. The goal is not to eliminate uncertainty entirely but to eliminate a degree of uncertainty that would
be unacceptable.

463. Anenson, supra note 59, at 47; supra Part I.
464. Anenson, supra note 59, at 47; see also supra Part I.
465. See Eskridge, supra note 66, at 680 n.17 (commenting that the order in which canons are considered may affect the results).
466. See discussion supra Sections II.B–C. Starting with the assumption appears inconsistent with the majority of scholarly commentary that conditions a canons application on a
sufficient degree of interpretative doubt. See Daniel Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 292 (1989) (asserting that judicial construction is legitimate
only when the statutory text and legislative intent are ambiguous); Sunstein, supra note 2, at
437 (insisting on a sufficient degree of interpretative doubt in order to elicit the canons);
Young, supra note 48, at 1606 (emphasizing that some boundary is necessary to trigger application of an interpretative presumption).
467. See Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Malani, Ambiguity About Ambiguity:
An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 24 (2010); Gluck, supra note
22, at 1836; Daniel A. Farber, Taking Costs into Account: Mapping the Boundaries of Judicial and
Agency Discretion, 40 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 87, 110–11 (2016) (advising that it is unclear what
factors create ambiguity in agency discretion cases).
468. See discussion supra Section II.A.2 (remedial canon).
469. See discussion supra Sections II.A.2–3 (remedial canon), II.B.2.c–d (“no contract”
canon); supra notes 274, 292.
470. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1975).
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It is important, nonetheless, to prevent a clear-ambiguous “side
show” from becoming the main event. Otherwise, judicial resources may be devoted improperly to debating gatekeeper findings about ambiguity and not directed at the crucial issue of statu471
tory meaning. Findings of ambiguity can be manipulated and
unsatisfying to litigants. Helping judges to understand the threshold inquiry into ambiguity would best curb judicial discretion. Even
though courts consistently begin with the text in applying the unmistakability doctrine, they should not be so inflexible that the definition of words dictates the outcome in spite of other evidence
472
that might bear on the issue. Real life does not usually fit neatly
into a fixed formula.
There are rule of law values at stake other than crystal clarity
and consistency too—ones that require litigants to know that judg473
es will actually listen to their claims and take them seriously.
Maintaining a “soft” rather than “hard” border builds moral credi474
bility and social legitimacy. The presumption against contract
promotes procedural values of institutional power, but it should
also be applied in a way that affords pension participants a full and
fair hearing of their claims. This should help to prevent misguided
results and promote more deliberative judicial decision-making in
public pension cases.
In cases applying the “no contract” canon, the upshot is that
most courts have allowed all available evidence to rebut the presumption. As a result, the “circumstances” beyond the text includ475
ed context, history, and structure. Even legislative history, for the
476
most part, was considered. And the statute’s etiology that embod471. Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Interpretation, 120
YALE L.J. ONLINE 47, 59 (2010); see Farnsworth et al., supra note 467, at 1; see also Ambiguity in
Legal Interpretation: A Debate, U. CHI. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Apr. 23, 2010, 11:45 AM),
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2010/04/ambiguity-in-legal-interpretation-adebate.html [https://perma.cc/QJ6S-L8H7] (judges and scholars commenting on Farnsworth et al., supra note 467).
472. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 27, at 28–29 (arguing that plain meaning analysis should
consider the larger statutory context); see generally Leib & Serota, supra note 471 (criticizing
one-size-fits-all approach to statutory interpretation); discussion supra Section II.B.2.d. In
articulating the sequence of analysis for the private law contract canon to resolve the constitutionality of public pension reform in Borders v. Atlanta, the state supreme court declared
that the trigger of ambiguity is resolved by the contract alone. 779 S.E.2d 279, 285 (Ga.
2015).
473. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 205 (1997) (identifying “consideration for
the interest of all who will be affected” as one of three judicial virtues that are the hallmark
of an acceptable opinion).
474. Leib & Serota, supra note 471, at 52.
475. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.d.
476. See discussion supra Sections II.B.2.d–B.3; Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation,
and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 965 (2013) (finding that legislators view legislative history as the most important drafting and interpretative tool besides the text).
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477

ies the wider context of the law was vital. Relying on precedent,
some courts have found ipso facto a clear contract (presumption
478
rebutted) in the employment setting. So while canons are often
479
assumed to operate outside context or legislative intent, this conception does not accurately reflect the canonical jurisprudence of
public pensions as it has developed in the case law across the United States. In the future, courts should enumerate the available
480
sources of consideration as this would provide helpful direction.
Identifying the relevant types of evidence would increase predictability and uniformity. The naming of sources would benefit lower
courts tasked with interpreting pension statutes, litigants who act
under them, and legislators who negotiate and draft the laws them481
selves. The bottom line is that many courts are flexible in how
the unmistakably clear contract requirement is satisfied. As established in Section II.C.3, the avoidance canon, operating in conjunction with the “no contract” canon, does not add much to the
analysis.
Despite the breadth of evidence available to establish a contract,
however, case outcomes show that the resistance to a statutory con482
tract is especially acute in public pension reform litigation. In
certain cases, in spite of employees not needing to produce express
language, they do have to point to language that is essentially inca483
pable of any other interpretation. Again, if too strict, a guideline
may become a substitute for good judgment. After all, judges
should not be blindfolded to keep probative evidence out of
477. See discussion supra Section II.B.3.
478. See discussion supra Section II.B.2.d; supra notes 332–333 and accompanying text.
The presumption was rebutted largely without reading the statute. Anenson et al., supra
note 11, at 46–47.
479. See discussion supra Part I.
480. Best practices in outlining the available criterion was exhibited by Maine Ass’n of
Retirees v. Board of Trustees of the Maine Public Employees Retirement System, 758 F.3d 23, 30 (1st
Cir. 2014).
481. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons: How Lower Courts React
When the Supreme Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 481, 496
(2015) (explaining that “the existing research suggests that the lower courts’ patterns of behavior do reflect—in a loose way—patterns in the Supreme Court”). If state courts get too
out of hand, state legislatures can always insert interpretative directions into the text of pension statutes to better guide judges in deciphering the law. See generally Jacob Scott, Codified
Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341 (2010) (comparing interpretative preferences of legislatures with judicial canons). Still, while the codification of instructions may increase the probabilities of a certain construction, it is no panacea for the complex problem of interpretation. See generally Romero, supra note 100, at 211 (analyzing the
effectiveness and desirability of statutory provisions that direct courts to interpret a statute in
a particular way). Clearer substantive provisions—like using the word contract—would likely
better control judicial interpretation and application. Id.
482. See Anenson et. al, supra note 11, at 37–47; Appendix. Fourteen of eighteen “no
contract” canon cases decided under the Contract Clause resulted in decisions favorable to
the government and upholding reforms.
483. See discussion supra Section II.B.2–3.
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484

view. Notwithstanding the academic uproar over canons of construction, everyone agrees that they should be helpful tools and
not the beginning and end of the analysis. In summary, subjecting
substantive canons to critical evaluation in the new constitutional
cases challenging public pension reform provides a valuable perspective and helps to legitimize the process of their development.
CONCLUSION
This Article is the first in-depth examination of substantive canons that judges use to interpret public pension legislation. The
resolution of constitutional controversies concerning pension reform under the Contract Clause will have a profound influence on
government employment. Employees want retirement security and
485
no doubt believed their promised pensions were unassailable.
The government does not necessarily want to break faith with its
employees but fears the after-effects of failing to reform. Already
grappling with mounting budget deficits, the escalating public
pension costs of state and local governments jeopardize the public
486
fisc and have a dire impact on essential public services.
Given what is at stake, the practical importance of the Contract
Clause has never been potentially greater than since the Great De487
pression. The same import may be attached to the substantive
canons, particularly the “no contract” canon (unmistakability doctrine) commonly invoked to determine whether pensions are contracts. Contrary to a recent study finding that substantive canons

484. Leib & Serota, supra note 471, at 60; J. Clark Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Statutory
Interpretation: Four Theories in Disarray, 53 SMU L. REV. 81 (2000).
485. See Puckett v. Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590, 604 (6th Cir.
2016) (expressing sympathy for retirees who gave years of dedicated and honorable service
as well as acknowledging the likelihood that they actually believed their cost-of-living allowances would not be reduced); Booth v. Sims, 456 S.E.2d 167, 188 (W. Va. 1995) (“Scores of
thousands of little people have organized their lives around government pensions . . . .”).
486. Anenson et al., supra note 6, at 34 (“Growing obligations raise the specter of more
taxes and fewer public services, including state funding of education.”); see id. at 34 n.201
(citing study showing that state aid to cities and counties has decreased in the last several
years); Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., & Wesley G. Russell, Jr., Judicial
Compulsion and the Public Fisc—A Historical Overview, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 525, 540
(2011) (“Public sector pensions will be the litigation flashpoint in this cycle of [state and
local government] austerity.”).
487. ELY, supra note 9, at 58 (explaining that the Contract Clause “would have profound
influence throughout the nineteenth century and would be among the most litigated provisions of the Constitution”).
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488

rarely make any difference in resolving cases, this canon has
489
been outcome determinative.
Yet substantive canons remain difficult to understand. For the
three canons routinely employed in pension law, there has been
remarkably little research on their history, evolution, or effect in
that context. This study spotlights the methodology that underlies
these diverse and complicated judgments. Illuminating actual judicial practices lets us better comprehend when, how, and why these
canons function. It puts us in a position to choose the most appropriate canon(s) and to otherwise offer improvements on their operation. It also allows us to relate the role of canons to other kinds
of legal reasoning. Significantly, studying these canons fills a void
in state statutory interpretation and contributes to a better understanding of state court enforcement of the Contract Clause that
490
has received scarcely any attention.
While this Article focuses on public pension legislation, it was
written for multiple audiences. Examining conflicting canons of
construction in the interpretation of government pension law contributes to the debates among scholars studying constitutional law,
federal courts, and those with expertise in employee benefits. The
analysis has implications for constitutional law, statutory interpretation theory, and pension doctrine and policy. The research likewise facilitates better decision-making by judges and the lawyers
who practice before them. It further assists policy-makers engaged
in the delicate task of crafting reform measures.

488. See Krishnakumar, supra note 25, at 829–32 (studying 296 U.S. Supreme Court decisions over a six-year period).
489.
See supra notes 399–400 and accompanying text.
490. ELY, supra note 9, at 3 (“It is important to remember that state courts did much of
the heavy lifting in interpreting and enforcing the contract clause. They are an integral, if
too often overlooked, part of the story.”). A premise of this article is that state law and
methodology are important in their own right and not just as an aid in the development of
federal legisprudence.

FALL 2020]

215

Clashing Canons

APPENDIX: PUBLIC PENSION REFORM CASES BY CANON OF
CONSTRUCTION: 2014–2019 491
FEDERAL AND STATE CASES
(2014–2019)

AVOIDANCE
CANON

492

“NO CONTRACT”

REMEDIAL

CANON

(PURPOSE)

(UNMISTAKABILITY
DOCTRINE)

CANON

493

S. States Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc.
X

v. Bentley, 219 So.3d 634 (Ala. 2016)
Taylor v. City of Gadsden, 767 F.3d
1124

(11th

Cir.

2014)

X

(Alabama

legislation)
Cal Fire Local 2881 v. Cal. Pub. Emps.’
X

Ret. Sys, 435 P.3d 433 (Cal. 2019)
Alameda Cnty. Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n
v. Alameda Cnty. Employees’ Ret.

X

X

Ass’n, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787 (Ct. App.
2018), rev'd on other grounds, 470 P.3d
85 (Cal. 2020)
Fry v. City of Los Angeles, 199 Cal.
X

Rptr. 3d 694 (Ct. App. 2016)
Marin Ass’n of Pub. Emps. v. Marin
Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n, 206 Cal. Rptr.

X

3d 365 (Ct. App. 2016), review denied,
S237460, 2020 WL 5667326 (Cal. Sept.
23, 2020) (mem.)
Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202 (Colo.
2014)

X

Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban
X

Cnty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590 (6th Cir.
2016) (Kentucky legislation)
Me. Ass’n of Retirees v. Bd. of Tr. of
the Me. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 758 F.3d

X

23 (1st Cir. 2014) (Maine legislation)
AFT Mich. v. State, 893 N.W.2d 90
(Mich. Ct. App. 2016) (dissent)

X

X

491. The table shows cases that recited, but not necessarily relied on, the designated
canon.
492. For cases citing the avoidance canon decided pursuant to the Pension Clause of the
state constitution, see Hall v. Elected Officials’ Retirement Plan, 383 P.3d 1107 (Ariz. 2016); and
Fields v. Elected Officials’ Retirement Plan, 320 P.3d 1160 (Ariz. 2014).
493. For a case citing the “no contract” canon decided pursuant to the Pension Clause of
the state constitution, see Jones v. Municipal Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, 50 N.E.3d 596
(Ill. 2016).

216

[Vol. 54:1

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Am. Fed’n of Tchrs. v. State, 111 A.3d
X

63 (N.H. 2015)
Pro. Fire Fighters of N.H. v. State, 107
A.3d 1229 (N.H. 2014)

X

X

Berg v. Christie, 137 A.3d 1143 (N.J.
2016)

X
X

X

Petit-Clair v. City of Perth Amboy, No.
A-2049-14T2, 2018 WL 4262959 (N.J.

X

App. Sept. 7, 2018)
Lake v. State Health Plan for Tchrs. &
State Emps., 825 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. Ct.

X

X

App. 2019)
Moro v. State, 351 P.3d 1 (Ore. 2015)
X
Cranston Firefighters v. Raimondo, 880
X

F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2018) (Rhode Island
legislation)
Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps. v.
Chafee, Nos. PC 12-3167, PC 12-3169,

X

PC 12-3579, 2014 WL 1743142 (R.I.
Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014)
R.I. Council 94 v. Chafee, No. PC 12X

3168, 2014 WL 1743149 (R.I. Super.
Ct. Apr. 25, 2014)
R.I. Pub. Emps.’ Retiree Coalition v.

X

Chafee, No. PC123166, 2014 WL
1577496 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2014)
Frazier v. City of Chattanooga, 151 F.

X

Supp. 3d 830 (E.D. Tenn. 2015)
(Tennessee legislation)
Wash. Educ. Ass’n v. Wash. Dep’t of
Ret. Sys., 332 P.3d 439 (Wash. 2014)

X

